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Abstract
It is a well-established fact that increasing firms’ productivity is a nec-
essary step to achieve sustainable growth and development. In fact, low
levels of productivity, in particular in the registered manufacturing sec-
tor, represent a major challenge for the Indian economy.
One key obstacle faced by these firms is the high level of employment
protection, which makes it difficult to compete with the other sectors
that largely rely on informal labour or flexible contracts.
High labour protection increases the incentive for workers to be absent
from the factories whenever they have access to better job opportunities
elsewhere. Moreover, India is undergoing a process of structural transfor-
mation, which is characterised by movement of workers from agriculture
into manufacturing. During this process workers are often engaged in
both sectors, particularly so across seasons. In fact, the lack of job oppor-
tunities during the lean agricultural seasons allows manufacturing firms
to pay relatively low wages but, during the peak seasons, workers may
find casual jobs in agriculture attractive and leave the firm temporarily.
Using firm level data, representative of the entire registered manu-
facturing sector, I find that absence rates are very high and negatively
correlated with firms’ productivity. In particular, I notice that absence
rates tend to be highest when labour demand in agriculture is highest,
i.e. during the harvest seasons. Using worker level data from a large jute
mill, I find that this behaviour is most common among workers who are
recent migrants from rural to urban areas who have access to agricultural
jobs in their home villages.
I exploit exogenous shocks to agricultural productivity, that increase
seasonality in agricultural labour demand, to estimate the effect of sea-
sonal absences on firms’ output. Finally, I develop a theoretical frame-
work that that illustrates how seasonal absences can be interpreted as
a consequence of asymmetric labour market rigidities between the two
sectors and estimate the cost of these rigidities in terms of loss in man-
ufacturing output and employment.
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1. Introduction
The classical growth literature characterises the process of development
as a transition from an economy dominated by agriculture to one domi-
nated by manufacturing and services (Kuznets, 1957). The first step of
this structural transformation is the movement of workers away from the
primary sector and into industry (Lewis, 1954). In this phase, manufac-
turing firms benefit from the agricultural “labour surplus” that provides
them with a large labour supply at a low cost. However, whilst labour
requirements in the manufacturing sector are generally constant over the
year, in agriculture they are highly seasonal. Therefore, a labour surplus
during the lean agricultural months is counterbalanced by a labour short-
age during the peak season. Consequently, agricultural wages increase
and may end up attracting manufacturing workers temporarily back to
the fields.
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effect of seasonal movement
of workers across sectors on manufacturing productivity. In particular, I
evaluate the effect of seasonal absences of manufacturing workers during
the peak season in agriculture, when their outside option is higher. More-
over, I analyse to what extent labour market rigidities, that prevent firms
from adjusting wages seasonally, end up reinforcing these productivity ef-
fects, slowing down structural transformation by reducing movements of
workers towards manufacturing.
Using newly assembled data for India, which provide rich informa-
tion on the timing of the agricultural production cycle, crop yield, agri-
cultural wages, weather as well as manufacturing output and workers’
attendance, I produce novel evidence of seasonal fluctuations in the agri-
cultural labour market and their causal impact on workers’ absences and
productivity in the manufacturing sector. I show that agricultural sea-
sonality is enhanced by weather shocks that affect agricultural productiv-
ity and, as a consequence, agricultural labour demand and wages during
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the harvest season. Such shocks provide a source of exogenous variation
that can be used to explain part of the year to year fluctuations in the
workers’ absences and quantify their impact on firms’ productivity.
Workers’ absences are a serious issue in this context. Indeed, every
year they cause the loss of 9.25%1 of working days in the Indian registered
manufacturing sector, a very high rate if compared to 1.2% in the US
and 3.3% in Canada2. Anecdotal evidence suggests that firms are greatly
harmed by workers’ absences3 but, to my knowledge, no attempt has been
made by the economic literature to quantify their cost.
Moreover, there is qualitative evidence that manufacturing workers
in India are more likely to be absent during the peak agricultural seasons
(Khurana et al. (2009) and Basariya (2015)) and that this is particularly
common among workers with an agricultural background, who tend to
return to their village of origin to take care of agricultural duties (Ku-
mar et al., 2014). However, there has been no attempt to analyse this
phenomenon quantitatively, nor to understand its consequences on firms’
performance, much less to evaluate the extent to which labour market
rigidities are responsible for such fluctuations and for the slowdown in
the movement of workers from agriculture into manufacturing.
India is an ideal setting for this research: its economy is still dom-
inated by the agricultural sector, which, according to the Population
Census, in 2001 was employing 53% of the labour force, but its future
growth crucially depends on the development of the manufacturing sec-
tor. Moreover, the size of the country allows to exploit local shocks to
agricultural productivity, affecting local agricultural labour market out-
comes (Jayachandran, 2006), while controlling for aggregate shocks that
affect the whole economy and, in particular, output demand. Finally,
the existence of heterogeneity in labour regulation across states makes it
possible to analyse the role of labour protection in determining workers’
attendance behaviour.
This thesis is divided into four parts. In the first part, I provide a
description of manufacturing and agricultural labour markets in India
and the linkages between the two sectors. I discuss the legal setting in
1Estimate based on ASI 2000-01 to 2007-08 data.
2The US figure comes from CPS 2012 and the Canadian figure comes from LFS
2011.
3For example Kumar (2010) argues that “one of the most serious problems with
which [Indian] industries are confronted today is that of absenteeism.” as it “erodes
the very potentiality, credibility and productivity of any company and organisation”
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which manufacturing firms operate and provide evidence on how labour
market rigidities may play an important role in determining workers’
attendance by showing correlations between the degree of employment
protection and absence rates.
I use rich data on Indian agriculture to document both seasonal and
year to year fluctuations of agricultural wages. I construct a district
level monthly dataset including information on intensity of agricultural
activity, agricultural output and weather shocks covering the 8 year pe-
riod corresponding to the fiscal years 2000-01 to 2007-08. This is ob-
tained by matching information on yield and cultivated area for the major
crops with their district specific sowing and harvest calendar and data on
weather realisations during the crop’s growing season. I exploit the het-
erogeneity in crop harvest calendar across Indian districts to show that
agricultural wages are higher when during the harvest period. Moreover,
I use weather shocks as a source of exogenous variation in agricultural
productivity and find that 1% increase in crop yield increases agricultural
wages by 0.16% during the months of harvest.
In the second part, I develop a model to understand how fluctuation
in agricultural productivity can affect manufacturing firms’ performance
in a context in which workers are allowed to move across sectors. Man-
ufacturing firms choose labour and wages knowing that, to encourage
workers attendance, they need to provide higher wages that would com-
pensate them from the lost opportunity to work in agriculture. I compare
the case in which firms are allowed to adjust wages and labour season-
ally and in response to shocks to agricultural productivity, to the case in
which labour market rigidities prevent these adjustments4. I show that,
if absences are costly in terms of productivity and firms can adjust wages
seasonally, it is optimal to increase wages to incentivise workers’ atten-
dance in the periods in which labour demand in agriculture is high. In
particular, firms would do so to the point that there would be no sea-
sonal fluctuation in attendance. On the other hand, when labour market
4This scenario is meant to represent the current institutional framework in which
the firms object of this study operate. Indeed, while the agricultural sector typ-
ically employs casual labour for short term jobs, firms operating in the registered
manufacturing sector are forced offers permanent contracts as the Contract Labour
Regulation and Abolition Act of 1970 established that manufacturing companies are
allowed to contract out only work which is non-core, non-perennial, and casual in na-
ture. Moreover, manufacturing wages are usually fixed and firms have little possibility
to sanction workers for being absent as they are subject to the Industrial Disputes
Act of 1947.
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rigidities prevent firms from adjusting wages seasonally, attendance rates
would fluctuate giving origin to “seasonal absences”. I show that this
would generate lower average attendance and productivity, lower wages
and potentially decrease manufacturing employment.
In the third part, I use firm level data representative of the entire In-
dian registered manufacturing sector, collected through 8 rounds of the
Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), covering the period from 2000-01 to
2007-08. I enrich the main dataset by matching it with monthly data on
workers’ attendance, collected in a separate part of the survey, which, to
my knowledge, was never used to perform econometric analysis. Exploit-
ing differences in agricultural harvest calendar across Indian districts, I
find that workers’ attendance is lower during the labour intensive harvest
months. I use exogenous weather shocks to agricultural productivity, that
affect labour demand during the harvest season, to estimate the response
of manufacturing workers’ attendance to changes in their outside option.
This approach allows me to compare workers’ attendance, within district,
across harvest seasons. I find that a 1% increase in yearly agricultural
wages, caused by positive weather shock, results in a 0.14% decrease in
yearly industrial workers’ attendance, a result that is both statistically
and economically significant. Finally, I estimate the effect of this phe-
nomenon in terms of output loss, finding large results: 1% decrease in
attendance rate, caused by a positive weather shock, reduces manufac-
turing output by over 6%. The interpretation of these findings is that
seasonal workers’ absences cause large disruptions in the firm production
process, possibly because many workers leave simultaneously and are dif-
ficult to replace, which reduces firms’ output much more than a change
in the labour force of equal size.
I use these results to calibrate the model described above and estimate
the cost of labour market rigidities in terms of output and manufactur-
ing employment. My findings suggest that allowing firm to adjust wages
and labour in response to temporary changes in agricultural productivity
would increase average manufacturing output by 5.13%. Moreover, this
increase in productivity will result in an increase in average manufac-
turing employment by 3.36%, without decreasing average wages. These
results suggest that labour market rigidities not only decrease manufac-
turing productivity, but also slow down the process of structural trans-
formation by keeping more workers in the agricultural sector.
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Finally, I use personnel data from a large jute mill located in West
Bengal to perform an insider econometric exercise which sheds additional
light on the the phenomenon of seasonal absences and its impact on firms’
outcomes. The jute industry provides an interesting setting for this study
because, for historical reasons, it employs a large number of workers who
migrated to West Bengal from neighbouring states (De Haan, 1997).
These workers typically come from rural areas and move to the city in
search of employment. However, in most of the cases, they leave their
families behind, thus keeping strong ties with their villages of origin. I
find that workers whose place of residence is a village outside the district
in which the plant is located are much more likely to engage in seasonal
absences than local workers. Taking advantage of high frequency output
data, I estimate the impact of seasonal absences on firms’ productivity
using the timing of harvest as an instrument for workers’ attendance.
The results suggest that 1% decrease in workers’ attendance during the
harvest season decreases the firms’ output by 1.6%. This more than
proportional response suggests that the firm is unable to adjust its pro-
duction process in response to changes in workers’ attendance and that
increasing the proportion of absent workers decreases the average pro-
ductivity of those present by generating disruptions and bottlenecks.
This thesis contributes to the literature on structural transforma-
tion5 by looking at how the interaction between agricultural and man-
ufacturing sector affect industrial performance. An important question
addressed by this literature is whether increases in agricultural produc-
tivity are necessary to foster growth in other sectors of the economy
(Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). Recent studies pointed out that, in order for
improvement in agriculture to have a positive effect on industrial devel-
opment, these changes must be “labour saving” (Bustos et al. (2016) and
Foster and Rosenzweig (2004)). Consistent with these findings, changes
in agricultural productivity that generate an increase in labour demand,
such as positive weather shocks, may end up attracting workers back to
the fields. Moreover, my model suggests that adding asymmetric labour
market rigidities to this context amplifies this effect and slows down the
structural transformation process by decreasing manufacturing employ-
ment.
The process of structural transformation was traditionally associated
5See Herrendorf et al. (2013) for a recent survey.
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to the migration of workers from rural to urban areas (Harris and Todaro,
1970). A recent strand of literature, however, has pointed out that it is
even more common for rural workers to seek employment in urban areas
during the lean agricultural season and then return to their village of
origin during the peak season (Bryan et al. (2014), Morten (2013), and
Imbert and Papp (2016b)). This thesis contributes to this literature as it
extends the concept of seasonal migration by showing that even workers
with permanent jobs in the manufacturing sector are likely to return to
the fields at the time of harvest.
The idea that seasonality in agricultural labour demand could harm
manufacturing firms in the early stages of industrialisation finds support
in the economic history literature. Sokoloff and Dollar (1997) argue that
the higher degree of seasonality characterising agriculture in England,
during the industrial revolution, favoured the development of cottage in-
dustry rather than more productive centralised plants that where preva-
lent in the US at the time. This is because centralised plants, being more
capital intensive, require constant labour inputs and therefore suffer more
from workers’ absences. Similarly, Sokoloff and Tchakerian (1997) found
that in 1860, US manufacturing firms located in counties where the dom-
inant crop had a more seasonal labour demand had a significantly lower
TFP than those located in counties specialised in less seasonal agricul-
tural activities. This thesis provides a causal estimate of the effects of
this phenomenon in an economy that, in present days, is still dominated
by the agricultural sector.
Moreover, this thesis contributes to the literature on the consequences
of labour market rigidities on manufacturing outcomes in India (Fallon
and Lucas (1993), Besley and Burgess (2004), Ahsan and Page´s (2009),
Aghion et al. (2008), Hasan et al. (2007), Adhvaryu et al. (2013), Chaurey
(2015)) by noting that one of the mechanisms in which the high degree
of labour protection characterising the sector may have a negative effect
on productivity and employment is by providing provides incentives for
workers to be absent from the workplace6.
Finally, this thesis contributes to the literature on the effect of work-
ers’ absence on firms’ productivity. Absences are usually considered a
negative outcome, as they create an extra cost for the firm in terms of
6Ichino and Riphahn (2005)and Riphahn (2004) find that labour protection in-
creases workers’ absences in different settings.
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reassignment of tasks to workers and substitutes (Allen, 1983). However,
their effect on productivity, measured in terms of output per hour effec-
tively worked, is not necessarily negative. In fact, present workers may
work harder to compensate for the absent ones and productivity per hour
effectively work may increase. Estimating the cost of workers’ absence
for the firm is, therefore, an empirical matter, which remains largely un-
explored by the literature. The major difficulty in this exercise is a clear
endogeneity problem: less productive firms are more likely to face higher
absence rates. This may happen for several reasons: for example poor
management quality may reduce both productivity and workers motiva-
tion; alternatively, firms facing a negative demand shock may encourage
workers to be absent if they cannot dismiss them. One solution to this
problem is to consider individual workers’ attendance and productivity
as did Miller et al. (2008) and Herrmann and Rockoff (2012) focusing
on the effect of teachers’ absence on students’ outcomes. Another possi-
bility is to use exogenous sources of workers’ absence, as in the study of
Krueger and Mas (2004), who estimate the effect of strikes on the quality
of output. This thesis solves this endogeneity problem by exploiting the
fact that workers’ absences in the manufacturing sector can be predicted
by changes in agricultural productivity, which are caused by exogenous
weather shocks. These shocks provide a source of exogenous variation
that allows me to causally estimate the effect of seasonal absences on
firms’ productivity. Indeed, by using an instrumental variable approach,
I am able to identify the local average treatment effect of changes in
workers’ absences that are caused by shocks to agricultural productivity,
which, in turn, affect only seasonal absences.
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows: chapter 2 describes
the relevant features of manufacturing and agricultural labour markets
in India; chapter 3 proposes a theoretical framework; chapter 4 provides
empirical evidence based firm level data representative of the entire sec-
tor; chapter 5 provides additional evidence and insights based on worker
level data from a large textile plant; chapter 6 concludes.
14
2. Manufacturing and
Agriculture: two Interlinked
Sectors
2.1 The Manufacturing Labour Market
The empirical work at the basis of this thesis relies on firm level data
representative of the whole Indian registered manufacturing sector. This
includes all firms with more than 10 workers1 involved in the manufac-
turing process that are officially registered according to the Factories Act
of 1948. This sector is often referred to as the “organised” manufacturing
sector and accounts for approximately two thirds of the Indian manufac-
turing output, which represents about 16% of Indian GDP. However, it
employs only for about 20% of the manufacturing labour force as most
manufacturing workers are employed in the informal sector (Sincavage
et al. (2010), data covering the period 2000-06).
As in most developing countries, the manufacturing sector in India are
characterised by low levels of productivity and slow growth (Bartelsman
et al., 2013). These issues have been explained by the literature as a con-
sequence of legal constraints (Besley and Burgess, 2004), poor manage-
ment practices (Bloom et al., 2010) and misallocation of resources (Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009). This thesis focuses on a less known phenomenon that
partly explains this weak performance: the fact that firms’ operating in
this sector suffer from very high levels of workers’ absence, which cause
the loss of, on average, 9.25% of working days every year2. This rate is
much higher than those recorded in developed countries, corresponding
1The 10 workers threshold applies to firms using electricity, for firms without
electricity the threshold is 20 workers.
2Estimate based on ASI 2000-01 to 2007-08 data.
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to, for example, 1.2% in the US and 3.3% in Canada3.
In order to understand why absence rates are so high, it is important
to consider the legal framework that regulates employment relationships
in this context. While the majority of the Indian labour force is employed
in the informal economy, workers employed in the registered manufactur-
ing sector enjoy a very high level of employment protection under the In-
dustrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947. Indeed, this act makes it extremely
costly for firms to sanction workers, even in case of prolonged unjustified
absences.
The literature has shown that high employment protection is likely
to give origin to moral hazard problems resulting in shirking and ab-
senteeism (Ichino and Riphahn (2005); Riphahn (2004)). However, no
attention has been paid to the fact that it may also create incentives for
workers to be absent whenever they have better job opportunities in other
sectors. This is particularly relevant in a development context, where a
large share of manufacturing workers come from a rural background and
have easy access to jobs in agriculture. Since agricultural labour demand
and wages vary seasonally, so will manufacturing workers’ outside option
and, therefore, their incentive to be absent.
The Annual survey of Industries (ASI), which is the main source of
data on firms operating in the Indian registered manufacturing sector,
collects firm level information on the number of days lost because of
workers’ absences4 at a monthly frequency. The analysis reported in
chapter 4 will use data from 8 rounds of the survey, covering the pe-
riod 2000-01 to 2007-08 to provide causal evidence of the existence of
the phenomenon of “seasonal workers’ absences”, defined as absences of
manufacturing workers that occur during the period in which labour de-
mand in agriculture is high, by exploiting heterogeneity in crop harvest
calendar across districts. Moreover, it will exploit exogenous shocks to
agricultural productivity to identify the effect of this phenomenon on
firms’ productivity.
3The US figure comes from CPS 2012 and the Canadian figure comes from LFS
2011.
4For a detailed description of the dataset refer to section 4.2.1
16
2.1.1 Labour Regulation and Workers’ Absences
The aim of this section is to illustrate the legal framework in which reg-
istered manufacturing firms in India operate, how it differs across states
and how it may affects workers’ absence behaviour. In section 2.1.3 I
will exploit differences in labour regulation across states to explain part
of the geographic variation in workers’ absences. In particular, I will
show that absence rates are substantially higher in states with stronger
employment protection regulation. This heterogeneity will be explored
further in chapter 4 where I show that the elasticity of workers’ atten-
dance with respect to agricultural wages is higher in the states where
workers are more protected, suggesting that employment protection not
only increases the incentives to shirk but allows workers to take advan-
tage of attractive outside opportunities.
Unlike the majority of the Indian labour force, regular5 workers em-
ployed in the registered manufacturing sector enjoy a very high level of
labour protection as their employment relationships are regulated by the
Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947. This piece of legislation covers
resolution of industrial disputes by setting up tribunals and labor courts
and regulating hiring and firing of workers, closure of establishments,
strikes and lockouts etc. An important feature of the IDA is that it
virtually prohibits firing of workers, especially for large establishments
(with more than 100 workers6) that are required to obtain government
permission for dismissing even a single worker.
In practice, this restricts the possibility for firms to sanction workers
even when they are absent from the workplace for a long period of time.
In fact, even if the firm has the possibility to remove workers from their
payroll if they take, long7, unauthorised leaves, workers that appeal to a
labour courts are usually reinstated (Kumar, 2010).
5These are workers directly employed by the firm on a regular basis, i.e. workers
employed through contractors, casual workers and apprentices are excluded.
6State amendments changed this threshold to 50 in West Bengal and 300 in Uttar
Pradesh.
7In principle workers who are absent for long periods could be removed from the
payroll on the presumption that they have abandoned their job. However, the law
does not clearly specify how long these absences need to be and the Supreme Court
repeatedly ruled that firing workers under such presumptions is illegal and constitutes
retrenchment. This implies that the firm has to hold an enquiry, prove the worker’s
misconduct and (if needed) seek government permission to terminate the employment
relationship. Only for extreme cases, such as workers being absent from the workplace
for over a year the Supreme Court overturned reinstatement sentences of labour courts
admitting that the presumption of abandonment was justified (Kumar, 2010).
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A rich literature has studied the effects of the IDA and, in particu-
lar, of its employment protection provisions contained in sections V-A
and V-B, on firms’ outcomes. Fallon and Lucas (1993) find that these
provisions largely decreased employment in large manufacturing firms,
i.e. those that are subject to the strictest labour protection provisions.
Besley and Burgess (2004) exploited the fact that, although the IDA
applies to all India, it has been amended several times by state govern-
ments, creating spacial variation in the degree of labour protection reg-
ulation. They considered all state level amendments of to sections V-A
and V-B of IDA and categorised them as “pro-worker”, “pro-employer”
or “neutral”, based on their content. Based on this, they obtained a
measure of strictness of labour regulation that varies across states and
over time and found that having a more “pro-worker” regulation reduced
firms’ output, employment, investment and productivity. These findings
were confirmed by a Ahsan and Page´s (2009) who find that the nega-
tive effect of labour protection regulation on employment and output is
larger in states where the IDA makes it harder to resolve labour disputes.
Aghion et al. (2008) found that firms located in “pro-employer” states
grew more as a consequence of delicensing and Hasan et al. (2007) showed
that labour demand elasticities increased more in these states as conse-
quence of trade liberalisation. Finally, Adhvaryu et al. (2013) found that
firms operating in “pro-worker” states adjust less their labour force in
response to local demand shocks and Chaurey (2015) found that in these
states firms are more likely to use contractors to adjust their labour force
in response to shocks, which can be explained by the fact that contract
workers are not protected by the IDA.
The fact that a high degree of job protection may increase shirking
and decrease attendance is not new to literature (Ichino and Riphahn
(2005); Riphahn (2004)). However, this phenomenon is usually associ-
ated to the behaviour of public sector workers that, especially in devel-
oping countries, are not monitored effectively and get paid even when
they are absent from the workplace (Chaudhury et al. (2006); Banerjee
and Duflo (2006)). Things are different for privates sector workers as
firms have high incentives to monitor their attendance and punish them
from being absent. In fact, even firing is almost impossible, the Payment
of Wages Act of 1936 allows Indian registered manufacturing firms to
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reduce the workers’ wages by up to 100% when they are absent8. This
thesis will show that, even for private sector workers, a higher degree of
labour protection provides incentives to be absent from the workplace,
whenever better employment opportunities are available.
2.1.2 Links between Manufacturing and Agriculture
This thesis focuses on “seasonal workers’ absences” that I define as those
absences that occur when labour demand in agriculture is high and work-
ers leave the firm temporarily to take advantage of job opportunities in
this sector. The purpose of this section is to explain the relevance of this
phenomenon in a context of structural transformation, in which manu-
facturing and agricultural sectors are closely related, to the point we can
say they share the same labour force.
The process of structural transformation is characterised by the mo-
ment of workers away from agriculture and into the manufacturing sector
(Lewis, 1954). However, during this process, workers are often involved
in both sectors, particularly so across season. This is because labour re-
quirement in agriculture are low for the best part of the year, generating
a labour surplus that can be exploited by the manufacturing sector to
hire workers for relatively low wages, but they increase dramatically dur-
ing the harvest season, causing many workers to return to temporarily
to the fields.
Indeed, while the classical literature was based on the idea that struc-
tural transformation involves permanent moments of workers from rural
to urban areas (Harris and Todaro, 1970), a recent literature has showed
that it is even more common for rural workers to seek employment in
urban areas during the lean agricultural season and then return to their
village of origin during the peak season (Bryan et al. (2014), Morten
(2013), and Imbert and Papp (2016b)). In this thesis I extend the con-
cept of seasonal migration one step further, showing that even workers
that enjoy permanent jobs in the manufacturing sector are likely to return
to the fields during the harvest season.
Although there is abundant anecdotal evidence that manufacturing
workers are more likely to be absent from the workplace during the peak
8The only exception is in case of statutory leave: the Factories Act of 1948 states
that workers who work for more than 240 days in a calendar year are entitled to 1
day of paid leave for every 20 days of work. Paid leave should be authorised by the
firm and scheduled in advance.
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agricultural seasons (Khurana et al. (2009) and Basariya (2015)) and
that phenomenon is driven by workers with an agricultural background
who tend to leave tend to return to their village of origin to take care of
agricultural duties (Kumar et al., 2014), this thesis is the first attempt
to provide quantitative evidence of this phenomenon and to causally
estimate its impact on industrial performance.
An important question addressed by the literature on structural trans-
formation is whether increases in agricultural productivity are necessary
to foster growth in other sectors of the economy (Rosenstein-Rodan,
1943). Recent studies pointed out that, in order for improvement in
agriculture to have a positive effect on industrial development, these
changes must be “labour saving” (Bustos et al. (2016) and Foster and
Rosenzweig (2004)). In other words, only technological changes that de-
crease labour demand in agriculture would generate movement of workers
towards other sectors of the economy producing positive “forward link-
ages”. Consistent with these findings, temporary changes in agricultural
productivity that generate an increase in labour demand, such as positive
weather shocks, may end up attracting workers back to the fields.
In this thesis I show that this phenomenon has the additional effect
to slow down the structural transformation process by generating sub-
stantial productivity losses in the manufacturing sector, which, in turn
result in a lower level of manufacturing employment. The model pro-
posed in chapter 3 highlights how this effect can be interpreted by the
consequence of asymmetric labour market rigidities across sectors.
These findings are supported by the work of economic historians such
as Sokoloff and Dollar (1997) and Sokoloff and Tchakerian (1997) who,
looking at England and the US during the industrial revolution, found
that higher degrees agricultural seasonality hindered the development
of capital intensive centralised plants. They argue that this can be ex-
plained by the fact that capital intensive plants require constant labour
input, which is hard to attain when workers are moving across sectors
based on the agricultural calendar.
2.1.3 Description of Absence Data
The empirical evidence on workers’ absence at the basis of this thesis
relies on firm level data from part II of the Annual Survey on Industries
(ASI). Although the ASI is the most widely used source of information
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on firms operating in the Indian manufacturing sector, researcher have
so far utilized only part I of this survey, which contains detailed informa-
tion on firms output and input use. Although ASI part II, which contains
monthly information on absences and labour turnover, is collected reg-
ularly for the same set of firms, it is not publicly available and, to my
knowledge, has never been use for research in economics9. The purpose
of this section is to provide a general description of the data, with the
objective to uncover some unknown facts.
I use data from 8 rounds of the survey, covering the period 2000-01
to 2007-08 and I restrict the sample to the firms for which both part I
and part II of the survey are available and can be successfully matched.
The final dataset includes 211,406 firm-year observations.
The definition of workers’ absence for the Indian legal system and for
the ASI data is “failure of a worker to report for work when he/she is
scheduled to work”. This includes: absence with or without pay, with or
without permission, sick leave and absence for personal reasons. It should
not include statutory leaves as these should be planned in advance and
the worker should not be scheduled to work. In practice, unscheduled
absences may be treated as statutory leave, i.e. the workers receive their
wages, as the management often fails to coordinate with workers and
schedule vacations and find it easier to discount the days of absence from
the workers’ leave allowance10.
9I thank the Indian Labour Bureau for kindly sharing the data with me.
10Anecdotal evidence collected during firm visits in India.
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Figure 2.1: Absence Rates by District
Notes: The figure shows the spatial distribution of average absence rates across dis-
tricts.
Figure 2.1 plots the spatial distribution of years average absence rates
across Indian districts. It shows that absence rates are generally high
across the country but there is a strong spatial correlation with certain
states presenting a substantially higher level of absences. Table 2.1 re-
ports summary statistics for workers’ absence rates by state. It shows
that the highest absence rates are observed in Kerala (12.66%) and the
lowest in Chhattisgarh (4.88%). The overall average is 9.27%.
To assess whether absence rates are higher in states in which labour
protection regulation is stronger I follow Adhvaryu et al. (2013) and
classify as “pro-worker” the states that passed more amendments in
“pro-worker” than in “pro-employer” direction. These are Maharash-
tra, Orissa and West Bengal11. Column 1 of Table 2.2 shows that ab-
11In their original classification, Adhvaryu et al. (2013), included also Gujarat
among the “pro-worker” states, however I remove it from this category for two rea-
sons: (i) the original coding of Gujarat was criticised by the literature (Bhattacharjea,
2006)(ii) during the period considered some “pro-employer” reforms where imple-
mented in the state.
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sence rates are on average 1.5 percentage point higher in “pro-worker”
states. Column 2 show that absence rates are on average lower in large
firm (defined as firms with more than 100 regular workers), however the
interaction between large and pro-worker is positive indicating a larger
absence rate in large firms that operate in pro-worker states, which is
where the workers enjoy the highest level of protection. These finding
suggest that labour regulation may play an important role in determin-
ing workers’ absence behaviour. Indeed table 2.1 shows that the states
classified as “pro-worker” and in particular Maharastra indeed report an
above average level of absences. However, this classification may not fully
incorporate some important features of the labour markets, in fact, the
highest levels of absence are recorded in Kerala, a state that, even if not
classified as “pro-worker”, has a long tradition of left wing governments
and powerful labour unions.
Another interesting fact, pointed out by column 3 of 2.2, is that
absence rates are 1.6 percentage point higher in urban areas than in
rural areas and, as column 4 shows, this effect is stronger in districts
in which the percentage of rural migrants is higher. As rural migrants
are more likely to engage in seasonal absences, this result suggest that
the phenomenon could explain a large part of the geographic variation
in absence rates.
2.2 The Agricultural Labour Market
An important feature of the agricultural labour market in developing
counties is the prevalence of short term casual contracts (Kaur, 2013).
Their availability is highly seasonal as it depends on the agricultural cy-
cle. Labour demand is higher during the months of harvest and much
lower during the rest of the year. As a consequence, seasonal unemploy-
ment in rural areas is a common phenomenon (Morten (2013) and Bryan
et al. (2014)).
Moreover, the amount of labour required for harvesting changes from
one year to another, depending on agricultural productivity, which is
turn affected by weather conditions (Jayachandran (2006)). If rains are
abundant, agricultural yield is higher and more labour is required to
harvest, which increases agricultural wages.
In this section I test whether seasonality and shocks to agricultural
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productivity are reflected into changes in agricultural wages. To do so
I construct a monthly panel dataset of crop yield, weather shocks and
agricultural wages at the district level for the period between 2000 and
2008.
While the causal relationship between crop yield and agricultural
wages has already been established by the literature, little attention has
been devoted to seasonality. Using data for India, Jayachandran (2006)
shows that rainfall has a positive effect on crop yield and agricultural
wages. Following the same empirical strategy, Kaur (2013) highlights
the fact that nominal agricultural wages are sticky and their response
to shock is asymmetric: wages increase following a positive shock but
do not decrease (in nominal terms) following a negative shock. Burgess
et al. (2014) find that temperature is also an important determinant of
agricultural productivity and rural income. In particular, abnormally
high temperature during the growing season significantly decreases agri-
cultural yield and rural wages.
However, these studies are based on yearly level data and define the
growing season as the period following the arrival of the Southwest mon-
soon. While this is arguably the most important meteorological event for
the Indian agriculture, it is not clear to what extent it affects agricultural
wages in all months of the year. Moreover, little is known about the role
of rainfall and temperature outside the monsoon season.
Since the empirical analysis proposed in this thesis relies on the exis-
tence of exogenous variation in monthly agricultural productivity, neces-
sary to establish the existence of seasonal absences, I construct a monthly
measure of “weather shocks” based on the crops harvested in each month
and their growing season and I show that it has explanatory power even
when controlling for monsoon season rainfall and temperature.
2.2.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Crop production data
I construct a district level monthly crop calendar based on the major
crops cultivated in the district. I match crops to their district-specific
sowing and harvesting calendar and then I aggregate the data into district
level weighted averages, using the area cultivated under each crop as a
weight. This allows me to obtain a monthly measure of the intensity of
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sowing and harvesting activities, which varies across districts.
The information about the agricultural production cycle comes from
the 1967 Indian Crop Calendar published by the Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics. This publication contains information about the
typical sowing and harvesting months of the most important crops at
the district level. For each crop, I define as growing season the period
delimited by the first month of sowing and the last month of harvest.
To match 1967 districts with 2001 districts I refer to Kumar and So-
manathan (2009), who provide a mapping of Indian districts over time.
When the crop’s sowing and harvesting information is not available for
in a district, I impute it using the closest available data in terms of dis-
tance between district centroids. The final dataset contains the months
of sowing and harvesting of 23 crops: bajra, castor seed, chillies, corian-
der, cotton, ginger, gram, groundnut, jowar, jute, maize (kharif), mesta,
niger seed, onion, potato, ragi, rapeseed and mustard, rice, small millets,
sugarcane, tobacco, turmeric and wheat.
I match the crop calendar information with district level data on crop
output and area sown for major crops for the period between 1999-00 and
2007-08, obtained from the Crop Production Statistics Information Sys-
tem website12. The same website provides district level information on
land use over the same period. Combining these datasets allows me to
construct monthly measures of crop yield and percentage of area har-
vested.
I calculate the share of cultivated area corresponding to each crop
dividing the area under crop by the total area sown in the district in
a particular year. I restrict the sample to crops that cover at least 1%
of the total area sown in the district. Furthermore, I exclude from my
analysis districts for which I have information about crop covering less
than 50% of the total area sown. Finally, I keep only crops for which
sowing and harvest dates are provided in the crop calendar described
above13.
I define crop yield as crop output divided by area under crop. For
comparability across crops I normalize yields to have mean one. I then
aggregate crop yields to obtain a district level measure, log crop yield
12The data were downloaded from the Crop Production Statistics Information Sys-
tem website: apy.dacnet.nic.in in November 2014.
13The excluded crops are: cashewnut, guar seed, khesari, maize (rabi), moth,
oilseeds and soyabean.
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index, constructed as weighed average of the log of yield of the crops
harvested in the district in a particular month. The weights are equal
to the share of the area under each crop14. If a crop is sown (harvested)
over more than one month, I divide the area cultivated under this crop
by the number of sowing (harvesting) months and impute it equally to
each of them.
I use the area under each crop, combined with the crop’s sowing and
harvesting dates to construct a district level calendar, indicating the in-
tensity of sowing and harvesting activities in each calendar month. Figure
2.2, plotting the average share of agricultural area sown and harvested
in each calendar month, illustrates the main features of the Indian agri-
cultural cycle. There are two main growing seasons: rabi and kharif.
Kharif crops are sown between June and July, when the first monsoon
rains arrive, and harvested between October and December; while rabi
crops are sown between October and November and harvest in March
and April.
Figure 2.2: Harvest and Sowing Seasons
Notes: the percentage of total area harvested and sown in a given month is calculated
by matching yearly data on area under major crops with the crop specific crop calendar
at the district level. The results obtained are then averaged over the 2000-2007 period.
When a crop is harvested/sown in more than a month, its area is divided by the
number of months of harvest/sowing and inputed equally to each of them.
14Unlike Jayachandran (2006), who constructs a similar index using share of revenue
originate by the crop as weight, I choose to use share of area sown as it better proxies
the amount of labour required for harvesting.
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Agricultural wages
The crop production and weather data are matched with district level
information on monthly agricultural wages collected by the Directorate
of Economics and Statistics of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture in a
yearly publication called “Agricultural Wages in India” (AWI)15. I con-
sider only male wages for occupations related to field labour. The data
were originally collected at the centre level and, in 10% of the cases,
multiple observations per district are available. In such cases I simply
take the average of the observed wages. The original dataset covers 374
districts, however, I restrict the attention to the districts for which at
least 12 monthly agricultural wage observations are available in the pe-
riod between January 2000 and December 2007. After dropping a few
districts for which agricultural information is not available I have a panel
of agricultural wages for 272 districts. This panel is highly unbalanced
and, on average, 49.5 monthly wage observations are available over a 96
months’ period.
Weather shocks
I construct district-wise monthly weather shocks using use rainfall and
temperature data collected by the Center of Climatic Research at the
University of Delaware16. This dataset contains a time series of average
monthly rainfall and temperature interpolated into a 0.5 by 0.5 degree
latitude-longitude grid. Using a shapefile of Indian district in 2001, I
compute the coordinates of each district’s centroid and I match them to
the closest point on the grid to obtain monthly average temperature and
rainfall for each district.
Following Donaldson (2015) I construct a crop specific measure of
weather shocks, defined as cumulative rainfall or average temperature
during the crop’s growing season, that is defined as the period of time
between the first month of sowing and the last month of harvesting.
To aggregate them in a district level measure, I compute the weighted
average of the shocks affecting all crops harvested in the district in a given
month, using as weights the share of agricultural area under each crop.
15The data I am using were kindly shared with me by Thiemo Fetzer who digitised
and prepared them for the paper Fetzer (2013).
16The data were downloaded from the Center of Climatic Research at the University
of Delaware website: http://climate.geog.udel.edu/ climate/ in March 2014
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Similarly, a yearly measure of weather shocks is obtained by aggregating
the monthly measures in a weighted average, with weights equal to the
share of area harvested in each month.
Descriptive Statistics
The dataset I constructed includes a monthly panel of district level har-
vesting and sowing intensity, crop yield index, weather information and
agricultural wages. It covers 272 Indian district over a 8 years’ period
starting on January 2000 and and ending in December 2007. Table 4.1
reports summary statistics for the variables used to perform the analysis
described in this chapter.
This panel dataset contains 24,124 district - month observations for
crop calendar and weather information. However, the agricultural wage
data is highly unbalanced and wages are available only for 55% of the
sample: 13,278 observations. This is partly explained by the fact that
agricultural wages in some districts are not collected during the lean
agricultural season. Finally, crop yield is observed only in the months
in which the crops are harvested, that is for 54% of the sample: 12,929
observations. This implies that rainfall and temperature indices, since
they are based on the crops’ growing seasons, are also available for these
months. In order to deal with this issues I include in the analysis a
number of fixed effects that allow me to capture the variation of interest.
The average amount of growing season rainfall is 704 mm; while the
average temperature is 25.32°C. These figures can be compared with the
average amount of rainfall in a month: almost 93 mm; and the average
monthly temperature in the districts considered: 25.77°C. Since the av-
erage length of a crop’s growing season in my dataset is 5.6 months, the
amount of rain during the growing season months is above average and
temperature is below average, which is what we would expect for India.
The correlation between agricultural wages and the share of area har-
vested in a calendar month is illustrated by figure 2.3. To remove the
composition effect, which is relevant since the panel of agricultural wages
is highly unbalanced, the dashed line represents the residual of a regres-
sion of log(ag wage) in district and year dummies. The solid line rep-
resents the share of area harvested in the calendar month, as in figure ,
with the difference that here the sample is restricted to the observations
for which agricultural wages are available. The graph shows that agri-
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cultural wages are higher in the months in which a higher percentage of
the agricultural area is harvested.
Figure 2.3: Agricultural Wages
Notes: The variable log wage res is the residual from the regression of log of agricul-
tural wages on district FE and year FE. The percentage of area harvested is calculated
as the average of the observations for which the agricultural wage is non missing.
2.2.2 Empirical Strategy
In order to estimate to what extent agricultural wages follow the agri-
cultural cycle I exploit the variation in harvest calendar across districts.
This is generated by the fact that districts specialise in different crops
that may differ in harvest calendar, but also to the fact that crops’ har-
vest calendars vary across districts. I estimate the following equation:
log(ag wagetmd) = αharvesttmd + δd + em + vt + utmd (2.1)
where log(ag wagetmd) is natural logarithm of agricultural wage in dis-
trict d in month m of year t; harvesttmd represents the percentage of
the total agricultural land of district d that is harvested in month m of
year t; δd, vt and em represent district, year and calendar month fixed
effects, respectively. If agricultural wages respond to changes in agricul-
tural labour demand, they should be higher in the months in which a
higher percentage of agricultural land is harvested. I cluster standard
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errors at the district level to account for the presence of autocorrelation.
The next step is to estimate the response of agricultural wages to
shocks to agricultural productivity. The empirical model to be estimated
is the following:
log(ag wagetmd) = β1log yield indextmd + edm + vt + tmd (2.2)
where log yield indextmd is a proxy of agricultural productivity in month
m of year t in district d, in terms of crop output per acre. In order
to obtain an index representing the yield of all crops harvested in the
district in a month I normalize the yields of all crops to have mean 1 and
then compute the weighted average of the log of all these yields, using as
weights the share of the total area harvested in that month corresponding
to each crop.
Following Jayachandran (2006) I use weather shocks as instrument
for crop yield. This solves the problem that agricultural wages and agri-
cultural output may move simultaneously for other reasons, for example
following shocks to crop demand. The first stage regression is:
log yield indextmd = β2weather indextmd + edm + vt + wtmd (2.3)
where weather indextmd is a measure of weather relevant for the crops
harvested in month m of year t in district d. In particular, I create a
crop specific measure of growing season cumulative rainfall and average
temperature and then aggregate them at the district-calendar month level
in a weighted average, as for the yield index, with weights representing
the relative importance of each crops in terms of agricultural area.
I include fixed effect for district-calendar month (edm) and year (vt)
in both first and second stage regression and I cluster standard errors at
the district level to account for the presence of autocorrelation.
2.2.3 Results
Table 2.4 reports the estimates for equation 2.1. The results show that
agricultural wages are higher during the harvest season and the effect
is positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient
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suggests that going from 0 of agricultural land harvested to 100% in-
creases agricultural wages by 3.3%. While these results provide sugges-
tive evidence of seasonality in the agricultural labour market, they are
likely to severely understate the importance of the phenomenon. Indeed,
the changes in labour demand are likely to affect the number of jobs
created much more than they affect wages because the latter tend to be
sticky, as pointed out by Kaur (2013). Columns (3) and (4) show that
the results are robust to the inclusion of calendar month fixed effects,
thus exploiting only the differences in harvest calendar across districts.
Finally, columns (2) and (4) suggest that the share of agricultural area
sown in the month has no significant effect on agricultural wages.
Once I established that agricultural wages vary seasonally following
the agricultural cycle, I test whether this variation is exacerbated by
changes in agricultural productivity. By estimating equation 2.2 I com-
pare agricultural wages within each harvest season across years and mea-
sure their response to changes in agricultural productivity. Since agricul-
tural productivity and wages may be endogenously correlated I rely on
exogenous weather shocks to obtain a causal estimate of the parameter
of interest.
Table 2.5 reports the first stage results by estimating equation 2.3.
The first 3 columns are estimated on the entire sample for which yield
data are available; while the last 3 only on the sub-sample of observations
for which also agricultural wages are non-missing. The effect of rainfall
on crop yield is positive and the effect of temperature is negative, as
expected. In particular, column (3) shows that a 100 mm increase in
rainfall over the crops’ growing season is estimated to increase crop yield
by 2.8%, while 1°C increase in average temperature would reduce crop
yield by 7.8%. Column (6) shows that the estimated effects of rainfall and
temperature on crop yield are similar in magnitude for the sub-sample
in which agricultural wages are available and they are statistically sig-
nificant. However, the temperature coefficient is smaller 5.4% and less
precisely estimated. I include in these regressions controls for contempo-
raneous monthly rainfall and temperature: the corresponding coefficient
are small and non-significant in the specifications that include both grow-
ing season temperature and rainfall and have and removing them has a
negligible impact on the coefficients of interest.
In order to verify that the effect of weather shocks on crop yield is
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relevant for the crops harvested in all months of the year I estimate
equation 2.3 on one calendar month at a time, the estimated coefficients
and confidence intervals are reported in figure 2.4. These results show
that the effect of rainfall is positive and significant for the crops harvested
between September and March, a period that includes almost the entire
kharif and rabi seasons. The effect of Temperature is negative for all
months of the year but it is statistically different from zero only between
November and January. The lack of precision of the coefficients estimated
for the central month of the year can be explained by the fact that these
are based on a small number of observations. As figure 2.2.1 shows, in
this period only a small percentage of the agricultural area is harvested
and, therefore, crop yield data would be missing in most districts.
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Figure 2.4: Weather Shocks and Agricultural Wages
Notes: the figures plot the estimated effect of rainfall and temperature on crop yield
and their 95% confidence intervals. They are obtained regressing rainfall and temper-
ature indices on log of crop yield index interacted with calendar month dummies. Log
crop yield, rainfall and temperature indices are computed as the weighted average of
the respective crop-level measures, with weights equal to the relative importance of
each crop, in terms of area sown among those harvested in the same month. In par-
ticular, log crop yield is the natural logarithm of the crop output divided by its area
planted, normalised to mean 1; rainfall and temperature are measured as cumulative
rainfall and average temperature over the crop’s growing season, which is defined
as the period between the first month of sowing and the last month of harvest, the
regression includes controls for contemporaneous monthly rainfall and temperature.
Table 2.6 reports the results of the estimate of the effect of crop yield
on agricultural wages. The first stage regression is the same as that re-
ported in table 2.5, column (6). The second stage results, reported in
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column (2), shows that 1% increase in crop yield results in a 0.156%
increase in agricultural wages17. This result is very similar to that esti-
mated by the literature18. Column (3) shows the reduce form effect of
weather on wages: the effect of rainfall is positive and significant and
that of temperature is negative but not statistically different from zero.
The results reported in this section indicate that wages in agriculture
are higher during the harvest and, across harvest seasons, they are higher
when agricultural productivity is higher because of the realisation of
positive weather shocks.
17The estimated effect of crop yield is similar, however less precisely estimated,
when estimated for kharif and rabi crops separately. Moreover, it is robust to number
of different specifications, including: measuring weather variables in terms of devia-
tions from long term mean, including quadratic terms and controlling for monsoon
rainfall (for rabi crops).
18Using shocks to yearly rainfall as instruments for crop productivity, Jayachandran
(2006) shows that an increase in crop yield by 1% results in a 0.168% increase in
agricultural wages.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Workers’ Absence Rates by State
State Mean Sd Dev Obs
Kerala 12.66 9.61 6,840
Himachal Pradesh 12.39 6.82 2,986
Haryana 11.48 8.31 9,079
Maharashtra 11.19 7.48 25,375
Uttar Pradesh 10.79 9.10 17,220
Punjab 10.25 9.42 12,730
Rajasthan 10.21 7.66 8,987
Gujarat 9.78 6.84 19,110
West Bengal 9.18 6.87 10,521
Karnataka 8.57 6.15 12,681
Jharkhand 8.24 5.50 3,141
Madhya Pradesh 7.96 6.17 6,051
Orissa 7.88 6.69 3830
Bihar 7.87 6.43 2,191
Uttaranchal 7.57 4.96 2,868
Assam 6.81 4.69 4,084
Tamil Nadu 6.51 4.04 24,416
Andhra Pradesh 5.71 4.17 14,995
Chhattisgarh 4.88 3.32 3,333
All India 9.27 7.28 211,406
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for
absence rates at the firm level. The data is ob-
tained from 8 rounds of ASI part II. All manu-
facturing firms that could be matched with ASI
part I dataset are considered. Small states and
Union Territories are excluded.
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Table 2.2: Determinants of Workers’ Absences
Dependent Var: Absence Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pro-worker 1.526*** 1.445***
(0.058) (0.065)
Large -0.866***
(0.042)
Large*Pro-worker 0.737***
(0.100)
Urban 1.653*** 0.584***
(0.044) (0.076)
Share rural migrants 3.206***
(0.342)
Share rural migrants*Urban 4.603***
(0.272)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 211,406 211,406 211,406 211,406
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.009 0.012 0.030
Notes: The dependent variable is yearly absence rate (mean 9.28). Pro-
worker is dummy equal to one for the states of Maharastra, Orissa and West
Bengal; Large is dummy equal to one if the number of regular workers em-
ployed by the firm is higher than 100; Urban is dummy equal to one if the
plant is located in an urban area. Share rural migrants indicates the share
of the districts’ manufacturing workers who migrated from a rural area, this
information is obtain from the 2001 Indian Census. Robust standard errors
in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics Agricultural Sector
Variable Mean St Obs Source
Dev
Log agricultural wage 3.917 0.341 13,278 AWI
Share area harvested 0.088 0.159 24,124 CPSIS
Share area sown 0.087 0.151 24,124 CPSIS
Log crop yield index -0.117 0.564 12,929 CPSIS and ICC
Rainfall index (100 mm) 7.044 5.992 12,929 Univ of Delaware,CPSIS and ICC
Temperature index (°C) 25.32 3.088 12,929 Univ of Delaware,CPSIS and ICC
Monthly rainfall (100 mm) 0.926 1.326 24,124 Univ of Delaware
Monthly temperature (°C) 25.77 5.26 24,124 Univ of Delaware
Notes: The data cover 272 Indian district over the period 2000-2007. CPSIS stands for Crop Production
Statistics Information System and ICC stands for Indian Crop Calendar. AWI stands for Agricultural
Wages of India, published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics of the Indian Ministry of Agri-
culture. Crop yield is computed as the log of the crop output divided by its area planted, normalized to
have mean 1. Cumulative rainfall and Average temperature are measured over the crop’s growing season,
which is defined as the period between the first month of sowing and the last month of harvest.
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Table 2.4: Agricultural Wage and Harvest Season
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(ag wage) log(ag wage) log(ag wage) log(ag wage)
Share area harvested 0.034∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
in the month (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Share area sown -0.010 0.002
in the month (0.006) (0.007)
District FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Calendar month FE - - Y Y
Observations 13,278 13,278 13,278 13,278
Adjusted R2 0.845 0.845 0.846 0.846
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the monthly agricultural
wage. Share of area harvested and Share of area sown represent the percentage
of total agricultural area in the district that is harvested/sown in the month. All
specifications are based on unbalance panel of district level monthly data and they
include district fixed effects. Columns (1) and (2) include year FE. Columns (3)
and (4) include year and month fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.5: Weather and Crop Yield (First Stage)
Dependent var: log yield index
Full sample Non-missing ag wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Rainfall Index 0.029∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Temperature Index -0.080∗∗∗ -0.078∗∗∗ -0.050∗ -0.054∗∗
(0.020) (0.020) (0.026) (0.026)
District - month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 12,929 12,929 12,929 7,092 7,092 7,092
Adjusted R2 0.638 0.634 0.641 0.674 0.670 0.675
Notes: The dependent variable is log yield index. Log yield, rainfall and temperature
indices are computed as the weighted average of the respective crop-level measures,
with weights equal to the relative importance of each crop, in terms of area sown,
among those harvested in the same month. In particular, log yield is the natural log-
arithm of the crop output divided by its area planted, normalised to mean 1; rainfall
and temperature are measured as cumulative rainfall and average temperature over
the crop’s growing season, which is defined as the period between the first month
of sowing and the last month of harvest. All specifications are based on unbalance
panel of district level monthly data and they include district-calendar month and
year fixed effects as well as controls for contemporaneous monthly rainfall and tem-
perature. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.6: Crop Yield and Agricultural Wages (2SLS)
FS IV RF OLS
log yield index log(ag wage) log(ag wage) log(ag wage)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rainfall Index 0.021∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.001)
Temperature Index -0.054∗∗ -0.002
(0.026) (0.008)
log YI 0.156∗∗ -0.010
(0.065) (0.011)
District - month FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 7,092 7,092 7,092 7,092
Adjusted R2 0.675 0.803 0.829 0.829
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) is log yield index ; while the depend vari-
able columns (2) to (4) is the natural logarithm of the monthly agricultural wages.
Column (1) and column (2) report, respectively, the first and second stage of the
2SLS estimate of the effect of crop yield on agricultural wages; column (3) reports
the reduced form; column (4) reports the OLS regression. Log yield, rainfall and tem-
perature indices are computed as the weighted average of the respective crop-level
measures, with weights equal to the relative importance of each crop, in terms of area
sown, among those harvested in the same month. In particular, log yield is the nat-
ural logarithm of the crop output divided by its area planted, normalised to mean 1;
rainfall and temperature are measured as cumulative rainfall and average tempera-
ture over the crop’s growing season, which is defined as the period between the first
month of sowing and the last month of harvest. All specifications are based on un-
balance panel of district level monthly data and they include district-month and year
fixed effects as well as controls for contemporaneous monthly rainfall and tempera-
ture. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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3. Theoretical Framework
I propose a simple model to understand how fluctuations in agricultural
productivity can affect manufacturing firms’ performance, in a setting in
which workers are allowed be absent and work in agriculture. Since agri-
cultural wages vary seasonally and in response to shocks to agricultural
productivity, manufacturing the worker’ outside option changes form pe-
riod to period and so do their incentives to be absent. Manufacturing
firms choose labour and wages knowing that, to encourage workers’ atten-
dance, they need to provide wages that are high enough to compensate
them for the lost opportunity to work in agriculture.
I compare outcomes in two different scenarios: “flexible” and “rigid”
labour market. Under the flexible labour market scenario, I assume that
firms can adjust labour and wages every period, after observing the re-
alisation of agricultural productivity. Instead, under the rigid labour
marker scenario, I assume that firms can only offer contracts that are
permanent and pay fixed wages. This implies that firms will maximise
expected profits taking into account the fact that, when a positive shock
affects the agricultural sector, a larger share of workers will be absent.
The rigid labour market scenario is meant to mimic the context in
which firms in the Indian register manufacturing sector operate, de-
scribed in chapter 2. Whereas, flexible labour market scenario should
be interpreted as a benchmark that allows us to evaluate the effect of
labour market rigidities on manufacturing sector outcomes such as work-
ers’ absences, productivity, labour and wages.
3.1 Workers’ Attendance Decision
Assume that each worker consumes only one good c at price 1 and get
utility log(c). Workers have, as their only source of income, labour in-
come and supply inelastically one unit of labour. If they work in the
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manufacturing sector they obtain a wage wm. However, they have the
option to be absent and work in agriculture for a wage wag. Doing so
will give them the additional utility ψ˜i ≥ 0, which varies across workers
and is unobservable to the employer. The utility that farmer is obtains
from working in agriculture is: log(wag) + ψ˜i. For simplicity, I define
ψi = e
ψ˜i and assume it follows a Pareto[1,δ] distribution. The role of this
parameter is to illustrate how some workers to obtain “extra utility” from
working in agriculture as it allows them to return to the home village,
visit their family or take care of their own land1.
Therefore, worker i will decide to be absent and work in agriculture
if:
log(wag) + ψ˜i ≥ log(wm) (3.1)
which is equivalent to:
ψiwag ≥ wm (3.2)
This implies that, for each realisation of wag, the attendance rate
faced by the firm will be2:
a(wag) = 1−
(
wag
wm
)δ
(3.3)
where δ is the elasticity of workers’ absence rate with respect to agricul-
tural wages.
3.2 Agricultural Sector
I assume that the agricultural sector is competitive and that production,
characterised by constant returns to scale, requires only labour input.
The profits of the representative agricultural firm can be written as:
piag = θLag − wagLag (3.4)
1I am focusing on an utility benefit rather than a transportation cost as workers
that are employed in manufacturing and would have to pay a cost to return to the
fields. If this parameter was negative it would be it hard to rationalise that workers
often prefer agriculture even if wages, on average, are lower. Therefore, I choose to
focus on the fact that, as the temporary migration literature has pointed out (Imbert
and Papp, 2016a), utility from being in the village is a major determinant of workers
decision to move across sectors.
2The CDF of a Pareto[1,δ], for ψ ≥ 1, is Pr(Ψ ≤ ψ) = 1 −
(
1
ψ
)δ
. The atten-
dance rate faced by the firm given agricultural wages wag can be interpreted as the
probability that the representative worker decided not to be absent or Pr(Ψ ≥ wagwm ).
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where the parameter θ represents labour productivity in agriculture,
which varies seasonally and is affected by weather shocks. Perfect com-
petition and flexible labour market make sure that the agricultural wage
in each period is equal to the current labour productivity: wag = θ. Since
the returns to scale are constant, firms are willing to hire any amount of
labour for this wage.
3.3 Manufacturing Sector
The manufacturing firm’s production function is assumed to be Cobb-
Douglas, modified to take into account the role of workers’ attendance.
The firm’s profits can be written in the as follows3:
pim = A(a
γLm)
αKβ − wmLm − rK (3.5)
where a represents the workers’ attendance rate; Lm and K represent
labour and capital, respectively; wm is manufacturing wage and r is rental
rate of capital. I assume that capital is fixed and exogenous. The ac-
tual amount of labour used is aLm, which corresponds to the number of
workers employed multiplied by their attendance rate.
The coefficient γ represents the effect of attendance on output. In
particular, if γ = 0 attendance has no effect on output, suggesting that
the firm can fully adjust when workers are absent; whereas, if γ = 1 there
is no adjustment and the effect of attendance is equivalent to the effect of
a change in the number of workers; if γ < 0 the productivity of the hours
actually worked decreases with attendance rate, as in the case in which
the present workers exert extra effort to compensate for the absent ones;
finally, if γ > 1 attendance has a positive effect on productivity because
workers’ absences cause some disruption in the production process.
The representative firm maximises profits by choosing both wages and
labour, taking into account the fact that the workers have the option to
work in agriculture. I start solving the model under the “flexible” labour
3Although I am assuming that workers earn the manufacturing wage only when
present, here I am assuming this is not reflected in the firm’s cost function. This is
due to the following reasons reasons: (1) intuitively, it seems unrealistic that work-
ers’ absences would generate savings for the firm as they may have compensate to
workers being absent by hiring substitutes or asking other workers to work overtime;
(2) introducing absences in the cost term would complicate the firm’s optimisation
problem making it impossible to obtain a close form solution.
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market assumption and then study how the results would change under
the “rigid” labour market scenario. Comparing the two outcomes will
allow me to estimate the cost of imposing labour market rigidities in a
setting in which workers are allowed to be absent and move across sectors.
I solve the model focusing on the case in which workers’ absences are
costly for the firm, i.e. γ > 1 as this is the most interesting to study. The
empirical analysis proposed in chapter 4 will test that this is the case.
3.3.1 Flexible Labour Market Outcome
Under the flexible labour market scenario, I assume that firms are al-
lowed to choose wages and labour in each period, after observing the
realisation of agricultural productivity and wages. Combing the first or-
der conditions for profit maximisation I obtain optimal manufacturing
wages, attendance and employment.
It can be easily shown that firms will set manufacturing wages wFLEXm (θ)
that increase in agricultural productivity, θ, in order to incentivise work-
ers’ attendance by compensating them for their outside option in agricul-
ture. In particular, manufacturing wages will be given by the following
equation:
wFLEXm (θ) = θ(γδ + 1)
1
δ (3.6)
This result shows that there will be a linear relationship between manu-
facturing and agricultural wages (that in this model are equal to agricul-
tural productivity, θ) and that manufacturing wages will be higher than
agricultural wages, as workers gain utility from working in agriculture.
Manufacturing wages will also be increasing in the cost of absences, γ,
and in the elasticity of workers’ attendance with respect to agricultural
wages, δ.
Moreover, it can be shown that the adjustment in manufacturing
wages, in response to changes in agricultural productivity, will be such
that workers’ attendance rate will remain constant at its optimal level:
aFLEX =
γδ
1 + γδ
< 1 (3.7)
Finally, since manufacturing wages are increasing in agricultural pro-
ductivity, the optimal amount of labour employed, LFLEXm (θ), will be a
decreasing function of θ and, as a consequence, so will the amount of
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output produced, Y FLEXm (θ). This implies that, when agricultural pro-
ductivity increases, manufacturing firms will increase wages to incentivise
attendance, but will also dismiss some workers, who will move to the agri-
cultural sector. Therefore, manufacturing output and employment will
decrease and agricultural output and employment will increase.
3.3.2 Rigid Labour Market Outcome
Under the assumption that firms cannot adjust wages and labour season-
ally and in response to shocks to agricultural productivity, firms max-
imise expected profits, knowing that workers’ attendance will change as
agricultural wages fluctuate.
The representative firm’s expected profits can be written as:
Eθ(pi) = AEθ (a(θ)
γα)LαmK
β − wmLm − rK (3.8)
where the only component that is affected by θ is attendance4. Equations
3.9 and 3.10 report and the first order conditions for profit maximisation
with respect to labour and wages.
αΓEθ(a(θ)
γα) = wmLm (3.9)
γδαΓEθ
(
a(θ)γα−1(1− a(θ))) = wmLm (3.10)
where Γ = ALαmK
β.
To obtain an analytical solution I assume that the parameter θ can
take two values: θH with probability ρ and θL with probability 1−ρ, and
that θH > θL. An interpretation for this assumption is that agricultural
productivity can be high when the rains are good, or low if there is
draught. Firms must offer permanent contracts with fixed wages and
cannot adjust them after observing weather realisation. An alternative
interpretation is to consider seasonal fluctuations in agricultural labour
requirements (and wages) and assume that the manufacturing firm is not
allowed to adjust wages and employment seasonally.
A direct implication of the fact that wages are fixed is that at-
tendance rates will be contingent on the realisation of θ. In particu-
4Combining equation 3.3 with the fact that agricultural wages will be equal to theta
we know that the expression of attendance as a function of agricultural productivity
is: a(θ) = 1−
(
θ
wm
) 1
δ
.
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lar, attendance will be lower when agricultural productivity is higher:
aFIX(θL) > a
FIX(θH). Moreover, since labour is also fixed, changes in
attendance will generate changes in manufacturing output, which will be
lower when agricultural productivity is higher: Y FIX(θL) > Y
FIX(θH).
3.3.3 Comparison Between Rigid and Flexible Labour
Market Outcomes
In this section I compare the results obtained under the two different
scenarios, to determine the effect of labour market rigidities on manu-
facturing outcomes such as workers’ attendance, wages, employment and
output. The proofs of the following propositions are reported in appendix
3.A.
From the previous section we know that, under rigid labour market
conditions, manufacturing workers’ attendance will depend on the re-
alisation of agricultural productivity. I will now compare the level of
attendance in the two states of the world (aFIX(θL) and a
FIX(θH)) with
the optimal level of attendance that would be achieved under flexible
labour market conditions, aFLEX .
Proposition 1
Under rigid labour market conditions, manufacturing workers’ atten-
dance is higher (lower) than the flexible labour market optimum when
agricultural productivity is low (high):
aFIX(θL) > a
FLEX > aFIX(θH) (3.11)
Moreover, average attendance under rigid labour market conditions is
lower than under flexible labour market conditions if the elasticity of out-
put with respect to workers’ attendance is greater than one, that is if
γα > 1.
Intuitively, firms operating under rigid labour market conditions do
not have the possibility to stabilise the level of attendance across peri-
ods. Therefore, they offer wages that, while attracting a large share of
workers when agricultural productivity is low, fail to keep attendance at
the optimal level when agricultural productivity is high. Moreover, if
absences are very costly in terms of productivity, i.e., they reduce output
more than proportionately, the optimal level of attendance is high and
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too costly to achieve in rigid labour markets, even as an average between
the high and the low states of the world.
In order to keep the level of attendance constant, manufacturing
wages offered by firms operating under flexible labour market condition
need to fluctuate mimicking those of the agricultural sector. It is inter-
esting to compare them to the optimal (fixed) wage firms choose to offer
under rigid labour market conditions.
Proposition 2
The optimal wage under rigid labour market conditions will be between the
wage that firms offer, under labour flexible labour market condition, when
agricultural productivity is high and the one they offer when agricultural
productivity is low.
wFLEXm (θL) < w
FIX
m < w
FLEX
m (θH) (3.12)
This results suggests that, while firms operating in flexible labour
market conditions offer low wages and exploit the labour agricultural
surplus during the lean agricultural seasons, firms in rigid labour markets
cannot do so. In fact, flexible labour market conditions allow firms to hire
workers who seek seasonal employment outside agriculture, e.g. seasonal
migrants, which is what we often observe in the informal sector.
In order to determine whether average wages and employment are
different across scenarios, it is necessary to make assumptions on the
parameters of the model. To do so, I use the parameters estimated in
chapter 4 and report the results in figure 3.1, which provides a graphical
illustration of the main outcomes of this model. The figure shows that
the effect of removing labour market rigidities would produce a large
positive effect on employment output when agricultural productivity is
low and a decrease in employment when agricultural productivity is high.
This, however, is followed by a much smaller difference in the decrease in
output, when agricultural productivity is high, between the two scenar-
ios. This is due to the fact that, even if the amount of labour formally
employed in rigid labour markets is constants, some workers move across
sectors anyway, by being absent. This decrease in attendance has a neg-
ative effect on productivity and therefore reduces output.
47
Figure 3.1: Rigid vs Flexible Outcomes
Notes: the figure illustrate how labour market rigidities affect different manufacturing
outcome according to the model.
3.4 Heterogeneous Workers
The model proposed above is based on the assumption that ψ˜i, the pa-
rameter representing the worker’s preferences towards agriculture, is un-
observable to the firm. However, in some circumstances it is hard to
argue that this is the case. For instance, rural migrants are much more
likely to derive higher utility from working in agriculture if this means
returning temporarily to their village or origin and visiting their families.
In this section, I propose an extension to the model in which I allow firms
to update their beliefs on workers’ preferences for agriculture and offer
different wages based on observable characteristics. The purpose of this
exercise is to determine whether it would be optimal for firms to offer
higher wages to workers who have higher incentive to be absent and work
in agriculture and whether such wages should be high enough to ensure
that the expected level of attendance is the same for all workers.
I assume workers’ “preference for agriculture” can be decomposed in
an observable, worker-specific component s˜i ≥ 0 and an unobservable
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component ψ˜i. Therefore, workers’ utility from working in agriculture
becomes: logwag + s˜i + ψ˜i. To simplify, I define si = e
s˜i and ψi = e
ψ˜i .
As before, I assume that ψi is drawn from a random variable Ψ following
Pareto[1,δ] distributions. Since si is observable, I allow firms to offer dif-
ferent wages to different workers depending on this parameter. Workers
will be absent from the manufacturing firm and work in agriculture if the
following inequality holds:
wim ≤ siψwag (3.13)
where wim is worker i’s manufacturing wage. The expected attendance
rate of worker i can be written as:
ai(wag) = 1−
(
si
wag
wim
)δ
(3.14)
To incorporate workers’ heterogeneity into the firm’s optimisation
problem, I rewrite the firm’s profit function as follows:
pim = A(
∑
i
aγi Lim)
αKβ −
∑
i
wimLim − rK (3.15)
This production function assumes complementaries between the different
types of workers. This is necessary to obtain interior solutions. In fact,
if workers were assumed to be perfect substitutes it would be optimal for
the firm to select workers with the lowest level of observable preference
for agriculture and supply side considerations would need to be made in
order to explain workers’ heterogeneity within a firm or even within the
whole manufacturing sector.
As before, I first solve the problem under the “flexible” and “rigid”
labour market scenarios separately and then compare the outcomes.
Flexible Labour Market Outcome
It is possible to show that, also in this case, firms operating under flexible
labour market condition will set wages in order to achieve the optimal
level of attendance: aFLEX = γδ
1+γδ
. However, now this implies offering
wages that depend, not only not the current agricultural wage, but also
on the worker’s observable characteristics, represented by the parameter
si as indicated by the following equation:
49
wFLEXim (θ) = siθ(δγ + 1)
1
δ (3.16)
In particular, wages will be increasing in si to incentivise the attendance
of workers with higher preference for agriculture. On the other hand, it
is possible to show that this heterogeneity in wages will be reflected by
the heterogeneity in the amount of labour, in fact, workers with higher
si are more expensive for the firm and fewer of them will be hired.
Rigid Labour Market Outcome
In the rigid labour market case firms are still forced offer permanent con-
tract with constant wages that cannot be adjusted in response to changes
in agricultural productivity but they are now allowed to offer different
contracts to workers based on the observable parameter si. Firms max-
imise expected profits represented by the following equation:
Eθ(pim(θ)) = AEθ
(
(
∑
i
ai(θ)
γLim)
α
)
Kβ −
∑
i
wimLim − rK (3.17)
To simplify the calculation is I assume that that the probability of
having a good shock to agricultural productivity is ρ = 1
2
and study
how wages and attendance will vary with respect to si. The proof of the
following proposition is reported in appendix 3.A.
Proposition 3
Firms operating in rigid labour market conditions will offer higher wages
to workers with higher preference for agriculture. ∂wim
∂si
> 0 However,
the increase in wage will not be enough to ensure equal levels of atten-
dance across workers. In particular, workers with higher preference for
agriculture will display lower levels of attendance
∂aFIXi (θ)
∂si
< 0.
An implication of this result is that attendance rate for workers with
higher preference for agriculture will be lower regardless the realisation
of agricultural productivity, but the effect is amplified when agricultural
productivity is higher.
The fact that workers with higher preference for agriculture earn
higher wage and are absent more often (and therefore are less productive)
both imply that the firm will decide to hire fewer of them.
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Comparison Between Rigid and Flexible Labour Market Out-
comes
This extension shows that the flexible labour market assumption, not
only fails to explain the seasonal patten in workers’ attendance we ob-
serve in the data, but it also fails to explain why workers’ with different
observable characteristics, such as the being migrants from rural areas,
could display different levels of attendance.
Another interesting outcome is that, while in flexible labour markets
workers with higher preferences for agriculture are paid higher wages that
fully stabilise attendance, under rigid labour market conditions, even if
paid higher wages, these workers are still more likely to engage in sea-
sonal absences. This behaviour has negative consequences on produc-
tivity which, importantly, creates an additional disincentive for firms to
hire them.
In conclusion, this model suggests that labour market rigidities have
the additional effect of reducing movement of workers across sectors,
therefore slowing down the structural transformation of the economy.
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Appendix
3.A Proofs
Proof of proposition 1:
Under rigid labour market conditions, manufacturing workers’ atten-
dance is higher (lower) than the flexible labour market optimum when
agricultural productivity is low (high):aFIX(θL) > a
FLEX > aFIX(θH)
Moreover, average attendance under rigid labour market conditions is
lower than under flexible labour market conditions if the elasticity of out-
put with respect to workers’ attendance is greater than one, that is if
γα > 1.
Let us define X as the ratio of attendance in rigid labour market
condition under low agricultural productivity and high agricultural pro-
ductivity:
X =
aFIX(θL)
aFIX(θH)
(3.18)
From equation 3.3 we know that X can be rewritten in as: X =
wδ−θδL
wδ−θδH
and
X > 1 since θH > θL. Combining equation 3.9 and 3.10 and replacing
the general expected value with the one obtained by assuming that θ can
take only two values we obtain the following expressions:
aFLEX
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα−1
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα = a
FIX(θH) (3.19)
aFLEX
ρX + (1− ρ)Xγα
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα = a
FIX(θL) (3.20)
where aFLEX is workers’ attendance rate under flexible labour market
conditions, reported in equation 3.7. It is possible to notice that X > 1
implies aFIX(θL) > a
FLEX > aFIX(θH).
Using equations 3.19 and 3.20 we can write average attendance rate
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(aFIX = ρaFIX(θH) + (1− ρ)aFIX(θL)) in rigid labour market conditions
as a function of aFLEX :
aFIX = aFLEX
(
ρ2 + ρ(1− ρ)Xγα−1 + (1− ρ)ρX + (1− ρ)2Xγα
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα
)
(3.21)
It is possible to notice that the condition under which aFIX < aFLEX is
that X > 1, which has been discussed above, and that γα > 1.
Proof of proposition 2:
The optimal wage under rigid labour market conditions will be between the
wage that firms offer, under labour flexible labour market condition, when
agricultural productivity is high and the one they offer when agricultural
productivity is low. wFLEXm (θL) < w
FIX
m < w
FLEX
m (θH)
Replacing the aFLEX = γδ
1+γδ
and aFIX(θH) = 1−
(
θH
w
)
, equation 3.19
can be rewritten as:
wFIXm = w
FLEX(θH)
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα
(ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα + (1− ρ)γδXγα (X−1
X
)) 1δ
(3.22)
Similarly, equation 3.20 can be rewritten as:
wFIXm = w
FLEX(θL)
(
ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα
(1 + δγ)ρ+ (1− ρ)Xγα − ργδX
) 1
δ
(3.23)
It is easy to verify that X > 1 implies wFLEXm (θL) < w
FIX
m < w
FLEX
m (θH).
Proof of proposition 3
Firms operating in rigid labour market conditions will offer higher wages
to workers with higher preference for agriculture. ∂wim
∂si
> 0 However,
the increase in wage will not be enough to ensure equal levels of atten-
dance across workers. In particular, workers with higher preference for
agriculture will display lower levels of attendance
∂aFIXi (θ)
∂si
< 0.
From the first oder conditions I obtain an implicit function for the
optimal wages offered to worker i and I differentiate it with respect to
si. It is possible to show that manufacturing wages will be increasing in
si as in the flexible labour market case. In particular:
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∂wim
∂si
=
wim
2si
> 0 (3.24)
The attendance rate of worker i, when agricultural productivity is
equal to θ can be written as:
aFIXi (θ) = 1−
(
siθ
wim
)δ
(3.25)
Using the result from equation 3.24 it follows that
∂aFIXi (θ)
∂si
= −δ
(
siθ
wim
)δ (
1
2si
)
< 0 (3.26)
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4. Seasonal Absences and
Industrial Performance
4.1 Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to provide quantitative evidence of the
“seasonal absences” of workers employed in the Indian registered manu-
facturing sector and to estimate the effect on firms’ productivity.
I define “seasonal absences” as those absences that take place dur-
ing the peak agricultural seasons, when agricultural wages increase and
workers have access to better outside options in the agricultural sector.
Since manufacturing workers are typically employed on a permanent ba-
sis, with wages that do not adjust seasonally, they have the incentive
to leave the firm temporarily and work in the agricultural sector, if the
probability of being fired is low enough.
Section 2.1.1 provides a description of the legal framework regulat-
ing employment relations in this context. Specifically, it describes the
main features of the Industrial Disputes Act (IDA) of 1947, the main
piece of legislation covering resolution of industrial disputes and regu-
lating hiring and firing of workers, closure of establishments, strikes and
lockouts etc. Importantly, the IDA postulates that establishments em-
ploying more than 100 workers need to obtain government permission for
dismissing even a sigle worker. This is true even in case of prolonged un-
justified absences and in fact, workers who get dismissed for this reason
are usually reinstated if they appeal to a labour court (Kumar, 2010).
The intensity of labour protection provisions varies across Indian states
as the IDA received numerous state amendments either in a “pro-worker”
or in a “pro-employer” direction (Besley and Burgess, 2004). Following
Adhvaryu et al. (2013), in chapter 2 I classify as “pro-worker” the states
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of Maharastra, Orissa and West Bengal1 and I show that absence rates
are on average 1.5 percentage point higher in these states, suggesting
that workers are more likely to be absent when the threat to be fired is
lower.
The analysis proposed in this chapter, is based on firm level data rep-
resentative of the entire Indian registered manufacturing sector, collected
through 8 rounds of the Annual Survey of Industries (ASI), covering the
period from 2000-01 to 2007-08. They contain a rich amount of infor-
mation on firms characteristics and productive activity, including input,
output and capital stock. Moreover, they provide a unique source of data
on workers’ attendance at a monthly frequency, which, to my knowledge,
have never been analysed before by researchers in economics.
I exploit the seasonal features of the agricultural labour market, de-
scribed in section 2.2 to quantitatively document the phenomenon of
seasonal absences among workers employed in the Indian registered man-
ufacturing sector. Exploiting differences in agricultural harvest calendar
across Indian districts, I find that workers’ attendance is lower during
the harvest months, which correspond to the peak season in agriculture.
I then use exogenous shocks to agricultural productivity (i.e. weather
shocks), that affect labour demand during the harvest season, to esti-
mate the response of manufacturing workers’ attendance to changes in
their outside option. This approach allows me to compare workers’ atten-
dance, within district, across harvest seasons. I find that a 1% increase
in yearly agricultural wages, caused by positive weather shock, causes a
0.14% decrease in yearly industrial workers’ attendance, a result that is
both statistically and economically significant.
Moreover, I estimate the effect of this phenomenon in terms of output
loss, finding large results: 1% decrease in attendance rate, caused by a
positive weather shock, reduces manufacturing output by over 6%. The
interpretation of these findings is that seasonal workers’ absences cause
large disruptions in the firm production process, possibly because many
workers leave simultaneously and are difficult to replace, which reduces
firms’ output much more than a change in the labour force of equal size.
1In their original classification, Adhvaryu et al. (2013), included also Gujarat
among the “pro-worker” states, however I remove it from this category for two rea-
sons: (i) the original coding of Gujarat was criticised by the literature (Bhattacharjea,
2006)(ii) during the period considered some “pro-employer” reforms where imple-
mented in the state.
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Finally, I use the parameters estimates in this chapter to calibrate the
model proposed in chapter 3 and compare the current outcome to a flexi-
ble labour market benchmark. The results suggest that removing labour
market rigidities, which prevent firms from adjusting labour and wages
in response to shocks to agricultural productivity, would increase average
manufacturing output by 5.13% and average manufacturing employment
by 3.36%, without decreasing average wages.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Firm Level Data
This chapter is based on firm level data representative of the entire Indian
registered manufacturing sector, collected through the Annual Survey
of Industries (ASI)2. They cover all registered plants employing 10 or
more workers using power and all plants employing 10 or more workers
if they do not use power, operating in the manufacturing sectors. Firms
employing more than 100 workers are surveyed every year, while smaller
ones are randomly sampled.
The survey is composed of 2 parts: Part I, collected on yearly basis,
includes data on firms’ assets and liabilities, employment and labour
cost, inputs and output; while Part II3 provides monthly information
on workers’ attendance and labour turnover. This paper uses data from
8 rounds of the 2 parts of the survey, covering the period 2000-01 to
2007-084. These include 107,539 firm-year observations.
All variables expressed in nominal terms were deflated using the all
India monthly CPI for Industrial workers5.
Absence data
In the survey absence is defined as “failure of a worker to report for
work when he is scheduled to work” that is “when the employer has
2See MOSPI (2014) for a complete description of these data.
3The two parts of the survey are administered to the same firms and can be
matched using identifiers. However, the reference period of Part I is the fiscal year:
from April to March; while Part II is based on the calendar year: from January to
December.
4Part I data were dowloaded from the LSE India Data Centre website
http://idc.lse.ac.uk/ and Part II data were obtained from the Indian Labour Bureau.
5The CPI data was obtained from the Indian Labour Bureau website
http://labourbureau.nic.in/indtab.html.
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work available for him and the worker is aware of it.” This includes:
absence with or without pay, with or without permission. It does not
include absence due to strikes and lock outs, lay off, weekly rest and
suspension(MOSPI, 2014).
The dataset contains monthly data on number of man-days worked
and number of man-days lost due to absence. However, firms operating
on “perennial” basis, accounting for 88% of the sample, are only required
to report this information for the months of March, June, September and
December.
Moreover, absence data are only collected for regular workers em-
ployed directly employed by the firm. These are permanent, probationer
and temporary workers. This classification excludes casual, badli or sub-
stitute workers, workers employed through contractors and apprentices.
Other variables
Relevant variables have been constructed following the tabulation pro-
gram provided in MOSPI (2014). These are total output defined as the
value all products and semi-finished products manufactured during the
year, plus value of fixed assets produced by the factory for its own use,
plus receipts from services sold, plus value of goods sold in the same
conditions as purchased; total input defined as the total value of mate-
rial and fuel consumed, plus cost of services purchased (repair, insurance
etc.), plus operating and non-operating expenses, plus purchase value of
goods sold in the same conditions as purchased; gross value added defined
as the difference between total output and total input ; profits defined
as gross value added minus depreciation of fixed assets during the year,
minus rent and interest paid, minus total labour cost.
Sample selection
The original Part I dataset includes 354,689 firm-year observations6. One
quarter of initial the observations are dropped because the firm was closed
or did not respond to the survey. Merging Part I and Part II results in
the loss of 36,949 observations, almost 14% of the sample. The lower
6I exclude firms not belonging to the manufacturing sector, about 5% of the sample,
and firms located in Union Territories or smaller states for which agricultural data
are not available (Goa, Jammu and Kashmir, Meghalaya, Manipur, Nagalanda and
Tripura), about 9% of the initial sample.
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response rate to Part II of the survey can be explained by the fact that,
while Part I includes only data that the firm is legally required to keep
to produce a balance sheet, Part II requires some extra effort in data
collection. The firms that do not respond to Part II are on average
smaller, younger and pay lower wages.
Another 35,592 observations, about 9% of the original sample, are
dropped because some important variables have missing, zero or non-
plausible values7. Moreover, 2,623 firms report negative or zero output
and are excluded from the analysis8.
Finally, firms belonging to the food-processing and tobacco sectors are
excluded from the sample because they are directly affected by shocks
to agricultural productivity through their inputs, which would invalidate
the instrumental variable approach used in this paper. The final sample
includes 107,539 firm-year observations.
4.2.2 Agricultural Data and Weather Shocks
The firm level data presented above were matched with district level in-
formation about monthly characteristics of the agricultural labour mar-
ket and weather conditions described in section 2.2 . The relevant vari-
ables are: agricultural wages, obtained from the “Agricultural Wages in
India” (AWI) collected by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics
of the Indian Ministry of Agriculture; harvesting timing and yield in-
formation for the major crops cultivated in the districts, obtained by
combining from crop calendar information from the 1967 Indian Crop
Calendar published by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics with
data on crop output and area sown collected from the Crop Produc-
tion Statistics Information System website; growing season rainfall and
temperature computed using weather data collected by the Center of
Climatic Research at the University of Delaware.
7The variables considered are: total output; total inputs; firm size; number of
regular workers; number of man-days worked; total labour cost; rural; ownership type
(public, private, etc.); organisation type (private limited, partnership, etc.); firm age;
number of months operational; number of manufacturing days.
8Negative observed output is possible because it includes the change in stock of
semi-finished products, which may be negative.
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4.3 Summary Statistics
Firm production data
Table 4.1 panel C reports summary statistics for the main firm-level vari-
ables used in the analysis: capital, number of workers and value added.
Both capital and number of workers are measured at the beginning of
the fiscal year. Value added is computed as the difference between total
output and the cost of materials, fuel, services and operating expenses.
Since the variables are expressed in logs, they exclude all the instances
in which capital or value added are zero or negative.
Absence data
Absence is defined as “failure of a worker to report for work when he
is scheduled to work” that is “when the employer has work available
for him and the worker is aware of it.” This includes: absence with or
without pay, with or without permission. It does not include absence
due to strikes and lock outs, lay off, weekly rest and suspension (MOSPI,
2014).
The dataset contains monthly data on number of man-days worked
and number of man-days lost due to absence. However, firms operating
on “perennial” basis, accounting for 88% of the sample, are only required
to report this information for the months of March, June, September and
December.
Moreover, absence data are only collected for regular workers em-
ployed directly employed by the firm. These are permanent, probationer
and temporary workers. This classification excludes casual, badli or sub-
stitute workers, workers employed through contractors and apprentices.
Absence rate is calculated the share of the man-days scheduled in
a month that are lost due to workers’ absence. Figure 4.1 shows the
distribution of firm level monthly absence rates, the vertical line indicates
the median of the distribution, which corresponds an absence rate of
7.66%. The figure shows that the distribution is highly skewed with a
large number of firms reporting very high absence rates. The average
absence rate is 9.7% as reported in table 4.1.
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4.4 Evidence of Seasonal Absences
The model in chapter 3 predicts that, if firms are not allowed adjust
wages and labour input in the short run, workers’ attendance in the
manufacturing would fluctuate across seasons. In particular, we expect
workers’ attendance to be lower when labour demand in agriculture is
highest, i.e. during the harvest season and when agriculture is more
productive.
Figure 4.2 plots monthly absence rates against the percentage of the
district agricultural area harvested in the calendar month. The solid line
represents absence rates when rainfall during the crops’ growing season is
high, that is over the 80th percentile of its long term (50 year) distribu-
tion; while the dashed line represents absence rates when rainfall during
the crops’ growing season is low, that is below the 20th percentile of its
long term distribution. The figure shows that absence are increasing in
the share of area harvested and more so when the amount of rainfall is
high.
In order to test the hypothesis that attendance is lower during the
harvest season formally, I exploit the fact that Indian districts specialise
in different crops and that crop calendar varies across districts. This al-
lows me to disentangle the effect of having a harvest in the district from
other seasonal events that may affect attendance, such as national festi-
vals or school holidays. The empirical model I estimate is the following:
log(attendanceidmt) = αharvestdm + βxidmt + δd + vt + em + uidmt (4.1)
where log(attendanceidt) is the natural logarithm of the attendance rate
in firm i, located in district d, in month m and year t; harvestdm is a
dummy equal to 1 if the main crop cultivated in district d is harvested in
month m; xidmt is a vector of controls that includes firm’s and district’s
characteristics; δd, em and vt represent district, calendar month and year
fixed effects, respectively.
I also test whether attendance in the manufacturing sector responds
to changes in the local agricultural wage by estimating the following
equation.
log(attendanceidmt) = αlog(agr wagedmt)+βxidmt+δd+vt+uidmt (4.2)
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where log(agr wagedt) is the natural logarithm of the agricultural wage
in district d, in month m and year t, the other variables are defined as
above.
The results are reported in table 2.4. Column (1) shows that at-
tendance rates are significantly lower during the harvest months; while
column (2) shows that the effect is significantly higher in “pro-worker”
states. These results suggest there is relationship between the seasonal
patter in workers’ attendance and the agricultural cycle and that the
effect is stronger for the workers that are more protected.
To address the concern that this may be driven by other events that
happen during the harvest months, such as harvest festivals or weddings
and to test whether workers’ absences are caused by the availability of
economic opportunities, I look at the response of workers’ attendance to
changes in the local agricultural wage.
According to the Payment of Wages Act of 1936, manufacturing work-
ers may have to forgo the entire manufacturing wage if they are absent
from the workplace. Since manufacturing wages are on average higher
then agricultural wages, it may seem implausible that workers would
choose to leave the manufacturing sector temporarily and work in agri-
culture. However, if we look at the distribution of the difference between
the firms’ average wage and the local district’s agricultural wages, plotted
in figure 4.3, we see that that, although the difference is in general posi-
tive, i.e. manufacturing wages are higher on average, often the difference
is small and there are some circumstances in which agricultural wages
are higher than manufacturing wages. Moreover, the overlap between
the entire wage distribution is likely to be larger. Finally, as discussed in
chapter 3, worker may obtain additional utility from working in agricul-
ture, especially if this gives them the opportunity to visit their family or
take care of their own land.
The estimated response of workers’ attendance to changes in the local
agricultural wage are reported in column (3) and (4) of table 2.4: as
expected, the effect of an increase in agricultural wage on attendance is
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that workers are absent
more often when they have a better outside option in the agricultural
sector. Also in this case, the effect is higher in pro-worker states, although
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the difference is not statistically significant9. The results are robust to the
introduction of district-month fixed effects, highlighting the importance
of changes in agricultural labour demand that occur from one year to
another, within the same calendar month.
The estimate relationship between attendance and agricultural wages
described above, however, is likely to biased due to endogenity problems.
For instance, agricultural wages are likely to be endogenous to other
factors affecting also the manufacturing labour market such as economic
opportunities in other sectors. Moreover, data gaps and measurement
error are likely to lead to make the estimate imprecise and biased towards
zero.
As a solution to these problems I propose a two-sample two-stage
estimation approach, described in the following section. In the first stage
I estimate the response of agricultural wages to exogenous shocks in
agricultural productivity for the sub-sample in which agricultural wages
are available. I then predict agricultural wages for the whole sample,
based on the estimated parameters and the available shock data. Finally
I use estimated agricultural wages to estimate the response of attendance.
Since the instrument for agricultural wages are available only for the
months of harvest, I perform this analysis using yearly level data, which
allows also to improve reduce the number of data gaps. Indeed, in many
cases agricultural wages are missing during the lean agricultural month,
when few casual jobs are available. By averaging the available I can
improve the quality of the data without losing the relevant variation for
this exercise, which is that due to changes in agricultural productivity
that occur from one year to another.
4.5 Elasticity of Workers’ Attendance with
respect to Agricultural Wages
The purpose of this section is to causally estimate the elasticity of work-
ers’ attendance with respect to agricultural wages. To do so, I propose a
two-sample two-stage estimation approach using weather shocks as source
9The lack of statistically significance can be explained by the fact that agricultural
wages presents many data gaps for the largest to the “pro-worker” states, Maharash-
tra, which reduces statistical power. Indeed, when replicating the estimate in column
(2) of table 2.4 on the sub-sample for which agricultural wages are available the coef-
ficient of the interaction Harvest*pro-worker is also not statistically significant.
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of exogenous variation.
The analysis reported in section 2.2 shows that weather shocks that
increase crop yield have a positive effect on agricultural wages. In this
section, I use weather shocks as instrument to estimate the causal effect of
agricultural wages on workers’ attendance. The identifying assumption is
that growing season weather affects attendance only though agricultural
wages. The major concern is that rainfall and temperature may have a
direct effect on attendance, for example high rainfall may decrease at-
tendance if it make it impossible to reach workplace because roads are
flooded. To address this concern, I control for yearly rainfall and temper-
ature and exploit only the variation in growing season weather. Another
concern is that a good outcome in agriculture can affect demand for the
goods produced by the firm and therefore the attendance indirectly. To
the extent to which goods are traded all over the country, year fixed effect
will control for this.
The first stage regression is the following:
log(agr wagedt) = γweather indextd + δd + vt + edt (4.3)
where weather indextd is a measure of growing season rainfall and tem-
perature that affects crops harvested in district d in year t.
The first stage is estimated on the sub-sample for which agricultural
wages are available. Then, based on the estimated coefficients from the
first stage, I predict log(agr wagedt) for the whole sample and I then use
these estimates to study the second stage. The second stage therefore,
becomes:
log(attendanceidt) = α ̂log(agr wagedt) + βxidt + δd + vt + uidt (4.4)
where ̂log(agr wagedt) is the predicted log of agricultural wage obtained
from the first stage regression. Since ̂log(agr wagedt) is estimated, the
second stage standard errors need to be adjusted following Murphy and
Topel (1985).
The results are reported in table 4.3. Column (1) reports the re-
sults from the first stage regression, which is similar to that obtained
using monthly level data in section 2.2, indicating that an increase in
rainfall, which increases agricultural productivity, has a positive effect
64
on agricultural wages, while an increase in temperature, which decreases
agricultural productivity, has a negative effect on agricultural wages. Col-
umn (2) reports the second stage estimate for the elasticity of workers’
attendance with respect to agricultural wages: the coefficient suggests
that a 1% increase in the agricultural wage reduces yearly attendance by
0.142%. Finally, column (3) shows that the effect is stronger in “pro-
worker” states, where a 1% increase in agricultural wages causes a re-
duction in attendance of 0.212%.
These result show that there is a causal relationship between shocks
to agricultural productivity, that affect manufacturing workers’ outside
option represents by potential income from working in agriculture, and
their attendance. The fact that this relationship is stronger in the states
where workers are more protected highlights the relevance of labour mar-
ket rigidities in generating this phenomenon, consistently with the theory
proposed in chapter 3.
4.6 Effect of Seasonal Absences on Produc-
tivity
The previous sections provide evidence the fact that workers’ attendance
in the Indian registered manufacturing sector is affected by shocks to
agricultural productivity. In particular, I have showed that workers are
more likely to be absent during the harvest seasons, that is when labour
demand is highest, and in the years in which agricultural productivity
and wages are higher. In this section I will estimate the effect of these
“seasonal absences” on firms’ productivity.
Although absences are usually considered a negative outcome for the
firm, as they create an extra cost in terms of reassignment of tasks to
workers and substitutes (Allen, 1983). However, their effect on produc-
tivity, measured in terms of output per hour effectively worked, is not
necessarily negative. Indeed, the firm may be able to compensate for the
loss in working time caused by absence by hiring substitutes of having
the present workers work overtime. It is also plausible that when some
workers are absent, the productivity of those present may increase if they
work harder to compensate. On the other hand, if the firm is unable to
find equally productive substitutes, absence may cause a loss in pro-
ductivity. Moreover, absences may create disruptions, reduce workers’
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morale and take up management time that could otherwise be devoted
to more productive activities.
The objective of this section is to estimate the effect of seasonal ab-
sences on firms’ productivity. This is a particularly relevant question in
developing countries, where manufacturing workers are likely to have an
agricultural background and easy access to job opportunities in agricul-
ture when labour demand in the sector is high. These absences may have
a stronger effect on productivity, compared to regular absences, for sev-
eral reasons: (i) having many workers absent at the same time is likely
to generate to cause larger disruptions; (ii) finding substitutes in these
periods may be more difficult; (iii) more productive workers may have
access to better outside opportunities and are more likely to be absent
in these periods.
To illustrate the problem formally, I rely on the model proposed in
chapter 3, where I assume firms in the manufacturing sector are charac-
terised by a Cobb-Douglas production function, modified to allow atten-
dance to have an independent effect on productivity, as in the following
equation:
Y = A(aγL)αKβ (4.5)
where a = attendance rate, L is number of worker-days scheduled and
K is capital. The actual number of worker-days worked will be aL:
the number of worker-days scheduled multiplied by the attendance rate.
The coefficient γ determines whether workers’ absences have an effect
on firms’ output and productivity. In particular, if γ = 0 attendance
rate has no effect on output, suggesting that the firm can fully adjust;
whereas, if γ = 1 there is no adjustment and the effect of a change in
attendance is equivalent to the effect of a change in the number of worker-
days scheduled; if γ < 0 productivity increases with absence rate, as in
the case in which the present workers exert extra effort to compensate
for the absent ones; finally, if γ > 1 absences have a negative effect
on productivity of the days effectively worked, suggesting they create
disruption in the production process. The remainder of this section will
be devoted to the estimation of this parameter.
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4.6.1 Empirical Strategy
The empirical model corresponding to equation 4.5 is the following:
log(Yidt) = αγlog(aidt) + αlog(Lidt) + βlog(Kidt) + eidt (4.6)
where: Yidt represents the output of firm i in year t and district d; Lidt is
the number of worker-days scheduled by firm i in year t and district d;
aidt is attendance rate in firm i in year t and district d.
The coefficient of log(aidt) combines the effect of a change in the
amount of days actually worked and the effect a change in attendance
per se. To obtain an estimate for the coefficient of interest γ I divide the
attendance coefficient αγ by the labour coefficient α.
Since the purpose of the analysis is to estimate the effect of seasonal
absences, rather than the effect of absences in general, I estimate equation
4.6 using a two-stages least square technique using exogenous shocks to
agricultural productivity, provided by growing season rainfall and tem-
perature, as instrument for attendance. The estimated coefficient will
represent the local average treatment effect (LATE) of the change in
attendance caused by changes in shocks to agricultural productivity.
Moreover, exploiting only the variation in absence that is caused by
these exogenous shocks allows me to take care of the endogeneity issues
related to this estimation: since attendance rates are likely to be lower in
less productive firms or in firms facing a negative demand shock a simple
OLS regression would lead to an overestimate of their effect. On the
other hand, yearly absence rates aidt is likely to be measured with error
as it is obtained by aggregating the four monthly observations available
in the dataset. This measurement error would probably bias the estimate
of αγ towards zero.
The first stage regression in this case is the reduced form estimate for
the analysis proposed in section 4.5:
log(aidt) = δ1raintd + δ2temperaturetd + uitd (4.7)
where: raintd and temperaturetd are measures of growing season rainfall
and temperature in year t and district d.
In order to obtain a consistent estimate of the other parameters in
4.6: α and β, and to address the concern that labour and capital may be
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determined after the shock to agricultural productivity takes place, I use
number of workers at the beginning of the year as a proxy for Lidt and
level of capital at the beginning of the year as a proxy for Kidt. As the
raw materials and other inputs used for production is likely to depend
on workers’ attendance and its inclusion in the regression would bias the
other coefficients, I measure Yidt in terms of value-added.
4.6.2 Results
The results are reported in table 4.4 . Column (1) reports the OLS esti-
mate of equation 4.6: the attendance coefficient suggest that 1% increase
in attendance increases value added by 0.887%. The OLS estimate for
γ is 2.2 and is statically greater than 1. The specification includes vari-
ous firm level and district level controls as well as district and two-digit
industry fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the district
level.
Column (2) reports the first stage regression. It indicates that 100
mm increase in growing season rainfall decrease yearly attendance by
0.1% and 1°C increase in average growing season temperature increases
yearly attendance by 0.3%. These estimates are obtained controlling for
overall yearly rainfall and temperature to address the concern that there
may be a direct effect of weather on attendance.
Column (3) reports the 2SLS estimate, the coefficient of attendance
suggests that 1% increase in attendance (caused by a decrease in seasonal
absences) increases value added by 6.21% a much larger effect of what
obtained with the OLS estimation. These results suggest that seasonal
absences have a large negative impact on firm productivity, indeed the
corresponding estimate of γ is 14.73 and is statistically greater than 1
(p-value=0.002).
Column (4) reports the reduced form regression, showing that growing
season temperature has a positive effect of value added, whereas the effect
of growing season rainfall is negative (although not statistically different
from zero).
4.6.3 Robustness
To confirm my estimate of the effect of seasonal absences on firms’ pro-
ductivity, I perform two robustness checks that I report in table 4.5.
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First, I consider the possibility that shocks to agricultural produc-
tivity may affect firm’s output, not only though workers’ absences, but
also by changing the number of contractors employed by the firm. In
fact, like regular workers, contractors are also likely to move across sec-
tors as pointed out by Colmer (2016) and Chaurey (2015). To address
this concern I control for the number of days worked by contractor in a
year. As this variable is affected by shocks to agricultural productivity
it is a “bad control”, which may invalidate my estimate. However, if its
inclusion does not affect my coefficients of interest, I can conclude that
changes in the contract labour use do not drive the effect that I find.
Indeed, by comparing column (1), which reports my main estimate, and
column (2) in table 4.5, it is possible to notice that the relevant coeffi-
cients are virtually unchanged.
Finally, I extend the analysis to firms who report zero capital stock,
which were dropped from my main production function estimate. Given
the magnitude of this subsample (over 32,000 firm-year observations) I
am concerned that my estimate may not be representative of the en-
tire sector. Therefore, I repeat the analysis by substituting the variable
log(K) with log(K + 1) and including these firms in the sample. The
results for this exercise, reported in column (3), show that, although
this leads to estimating an implausibly low capital coefficient, counter-
balanced by an implausibly large labour coefficient, the estimate of the
parameter γ does not change significantly and it is still possible to reject
the hypothesis that is equal to 1.
4.7 Calibrating the Effect of Labour mar-
ket Rigidities
In this section, I calibrate the model proposed in chapter 3 in order to
estimate the cost of labour market rigidities in a context in which the
workers’ outside option fluctuates seasonally and in response to shocks to
agricultural productivity. In particular, I compare the situation in which
firms are allowed to adjust wages and employment in each period, after
observing the realisation of agricultural productivity, to the situation in
which firms are forced to offer permanent contracts with fixed wages.
Table 4.6 reports the parameters used for the model calibration. High
and low agricultural wages are obtained by adding or subtracting one
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within district standard deviation from the average agricultural wage.
The parameters α and γ are obtained from the production function esti-
mation reported in section 4.6. The parameter δ, representing the elas-
ticity of absence rate with respect to agricultural wages, is estimated
using the same procedure as that used to compute the elasticity of at-
tendance with respect to agricultural wages in section 4.5. The level of
attendance in the rigid labour market scenario when agricultural wages
are low, aFIX(θL) is set to be equal to 0.91, which is the mean attendance
rate in the months of no harvest. Finally the employment level in rigid
labour markets LFIXm is set to be equal to 49.18, which is the median firm
size in the sample.
The results, reported in table 4.7, show that labour marker rigidities,
coupled with seasonality in workers’ outside option, cause a reduction
in manufacturing wages, employment and output. Indeed, as absence
increase, marginal productivity of labour decreases, and firm end up
hiring fewer workers even if wages are lower. Therefore, not only firms
lose in terms of output and profits, but also workers are penalised by
having access to fewer jobs at lower wages.
According to my estimates, removing these rigidities would increase
average manufacturing output by 5.13% and average manufacturing em-
ployment by 3.36%. Figure 4.4 plots the effect on output, labour and
manufacturing wages as a function of the ratio between high and low
agricultural wages. As this ratio increase, the gains from flexibility also
increase.
Moreover, in this case more workers will be employed in manufactur-
ing when the agricultural sector is less productive, resulting in a better
allocation of resources and greater efficiency.
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Figures
Figure 4.1: Distribution of Monthly Absence Rates
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of firms’ monthly absence rates. The vertical
line indicates the median absence rate in the sample, corresponding to 7.66%. Absence
rate is defined as the share of the man-days scheduled in a month that are lost due to
workers’ absence. Absence data is reported for the months of March, June, September
and December.
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Figure 4.2: Seasonal Absences
Notes: the graph represents the local polynomial regression of monthly absence rates
on the percentage of the district’s agricultural area that is harvested in the month.
The measures of rainfall and temperature used are based on the most important crop,
in terms of area sown, among those harvested in the district in the month. In partic-
ular, high rainfall is defined as the cumulative rainfall over the crop’s growing season
being above the 80th percentile of its long term (50 years) distribution. Similarly,
low rainfall is defined as the cumulative rainfall over the crop’s growing season being
below the 20th percentile of its long term distribution.
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Figure 4.3: Agriculturas vs Manufacturing Wages
Notes: the graph represent the distribution of the difference between the firms’ av-
erage wage and the local district’s agricultural wages. Although the difference is in
general positive, i.e. manufacturing wages are higher on average, often the difference
is small and there are some circumstances in which agricultural wages are higher than
manufacturing wages.
Figure 4.4: Gains from Flexible Labour Market
Notes: The graphs plots the gains from moving from a rigid labour market to a flex-
ible labour market, when the probability of having a positive shock to agricultural
productivity is 20%, as a function of the ratio between the high and the low agricul-
tural wage. The solid line represents the effect on output; the dashed line represents
the effect on labour; the dotted line represents the effect on manufacturing wages.
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Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Observations Source
Deviation
Panel A - Firm level data - Monthly frequency
Absence rate 0.097 0.079 404,222 ASI II
Panel B- Firm level data - Yearly frequency
Log capital 17.48 2.063 59,027 ASI I
Log number of workers 3.302 1.482 107,539 ASI II
Log value added 15.56 2.144 104,215 ASI I
Notes: ASI I and ASI II stand for Annual Survey of Industries-Part I and
II, respectively. Absence rate is computed as number of man-days lost due
to absence divided by number of man-days scheduled.
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Table 4.2: Workers’ Attendance - Monthly Level
(1) (2) (3) (4)
log(att) log(att) log(att) log(att)
Harvest -0.002∗∗∗ -0.001∗∗
(0.001) (0.001)
Harvest*pro worker -0.002∗
(0.001)
log(ag wage) -0.010∗∗ -0.009∗
(0.005) (0.005)
log(ag wage) *pro worker -0.004
(0.007)
Observations 404222 404222 139815 139815
Adjusted R2 0.127 0.127 0.152 0.152
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of monthly
attendance rates; Harvest is dummy equal to 1 if the districts main
crop, in terms of cultivated area, is harvested in the month; pro worker
is dummy equal to 1 for the states of Maharashtra, West Bengal and
Orissa; log(agr wage) is the natural logarithm of the districts monthly
agricultural wage. District level controls include monthly rainfall and
temperature. Firm level controls include: firm size, rural, owner-
ship type, organisation type, two digit industry. All specifications are
based on unbalance panel of firm level monthly data (for the months
of: March,June, September and December) and they include district,
month and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.3: Workers’ Attendance - Yearly Level
(1) (2) (3)
Log(agr wage) Log(attendance) Log(attendance)
Rainfall Index 0.009∗∗
(0.004)
Temperature Index -0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
̂Log(agwage) -0.142∗∗ -0.111
(0.067) (0.073)
̂Log(agwage)* pro worker -0.101∗
(0.060)
Observations 62601 107539 107539
Adjusted R2 0.84 0.165 0.166
Notes: Column (1) reports the first stage regression, the dependent variable is the
natural logarithm of the districts’ yearly agricultural wage. Rainfall and tempera-
ture indices are computed as the weighted average growing season cumulative rain-
fall and average temperature of the crops cultivated in the district, with weights
equal to the relative importance of each crop, in terms of area sown.Column (2) and
(3) report the second stage, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the
yearly attendance rate; ̂Log(agwage) is predicted from the first stage regression;
pro worker is dummy equal to 1 for the states of Maharashtra, West Bengal and
Orissa. District level controls include yearly rainfall and temperature, they are in-
cluded in all specifications. Firm level controls include: firm size, rural, ownership
type, organisation type, two digit industry, they are included only in the second
stage regressions. All specifications are based on yearly firm level data and include
district and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the district level in
all specifications, in columns (2) and (3) they are also adjusted to take into account
that log(ag wage) is estimated, following Murphy and Topel (1985). ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 4.4: Effect of Seasonal Absences on Productivity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS FS 2SLS RF
Log(value add) Log(att) Log(value add) Log(value add)
Log (attendance) 0.887∗∗∗ 6.212∗∗∗
α ∗ γ (0.101) (2.011)
Log L 0.403∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗∗ 0.422∗∗∗ 0.398***
α (0.015) (0.001) (0.017) (0.015)
Log K 0.580∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.568∗∗∗ 0.581***
(0.011) (0.000) (0.012) (0.011)
Rainfall Index (100 mm) -0.001∗∗ -0.001
(0.000) (0.004)
Temperature Index (°C) 0.003∗∗∗ 0.018**
(0.001) (0.005)
γ 2.201∗∗∗ 14.73∗∗∗
(0.264) (4.505)
P-value γ = 1 0.000 0.002
Observations 56786 56786 56786 56786
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.743 0.711 0.742
Notes:Column (1) reports the OLS estimate of the effect of attendance on output and pro-
ductivity; Column (2) reports the fist stage regression and Column (3) reports the second
stage.The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s value added;
while the dependent variable in column (2) is the natural logarithm of the firm’s yearly at-
tendance rate. Log L is the natural logarithm of the number of workers employed in the firm
at the beginning of the year; Log K is the natural logarithm of the firm’s gross fixed capital
at the beginning of the year; Rainfall and temperature indices are computed as the weighted
average growing season cumulative rainfall and average temperature of the crops cultivated
in the district, with weights equal to the relative importance of each crop, in terms of area
sown. District level controls include yearly rainfall and temperature. Firm level controls in-
clude: rural location, ownership type, organisation type, two digit industry. All specifications
are based on yearly firm level data and include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors
are clustered at the district level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.5: Robustness Checks
IV IV IV
(1) (2) (3)
Log(value add) Log(value add) Log(value add)
Log (attendance) 6.212*** 5.918*** 11.179***
α ∗ γ (2.011) (1.905) (3.315)
Log L 0.422*** 0.448*** 0.838***
α (0.017) (0.016) (0.019)
Log K 0.568*** 0.529***
(0.012) (0.012)
log(contractors) 0.050***
(0.002)
log(1+K) 0.037***
(0.002)
γ 14.73*** 13.20*** 13.33***
(4.505) (4.029) ( 3.767)
P-value γ = 1 0.002 0.002 0.001
Observations 56786 56786 78983
Adjusted R2 0.743 0.711 0.742
Notes: the table reports the 2SLS estimate of the effect of attendance on
output and productivity, using as instruments Rainfall and temperature
indices are computed as the weighted average growing season cumulative
rainfall and average temperature of the crops cultivated in the district,
with weights equal to the relative importance of each crop, in terms of
area sown. Column (1) reports the main specification; Column (2) adds
the the control log(contractors), which represents the natural logarithm of
number of days worked by subcontractors in the year plus 1. Column (3)
substitutes log(K)with log(K+1) in order to include firms that report zero
capital stock. L is the number of workers employed in the firm at the be-
ginning of the year; K is the firm’s gross fixed capital at the beginning of
the year; District level controls include yearly rainfall and temperature.
Firm level controls include: rural location, ownership type, organisation
type, two digit industry. All specifications are based on yearly firm level
data and include district and year fixed effects. Standard errors are clus-
tered at the district level.∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Table 4.6: Parameters Values
Calibrated Parameter Value Source/Target
High ag wage θL 44 data
Low ag wage θH 66 data
Probability θ = θH ρ 0.2
Length harvest season 0.33
Labour coefficient α 0.42 estimated
Attendance coefficient γα 6.18 estimated
Elasticity of absence wrt ag wage δ 0.69 estimated
Attendance when ag wage is low aFIX(θL) 91.03% data
Employment LFIXm 49.18 data
Notes: aFIX(θL) is equal to the mean attendance rate in the non-harvest
months. θL = wag − sd(wag) and θH = wag + sd(wag)where wag is mean
agricultural wage and sd(wag) is the within district standard deviation of
agricultural wages.
Table 4.7: Calibration Results
Flexible labour market
θ attendance (%) wage employment output
θL 91.03 100.00 52.59 102.71
θH 91.03 116.67 43.77 94.93
average 91.03 103.33 50.83 100.71
Rigid labour market
θ attendance (%) wage employment output
θL 91.03 100.00 49.18 100.00
θH 88.14 100.00 49.18 81.90
average 90.42 100.00 49.18 96.37
Notes:manufacturing wages are normalised to be equal to
100 in the rigid labour market case. Output is normalises
to be equal to 100 in rigid labour market case when agricul-
tural productivity is low.
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5. Seasonal Absences and
Rural-Urban Migration:
Evidence from an Indian Jute
Mill
5.1 Overview
In this chapter I use personnel data from a large jute mill based in West
Bengal, India to provide detailed evidence of seasonality in workers’ at-
tendance and the consequences of this phenomenon on firms’ output. The
availability of information at the worker level allows me to understand
which workers are more likely to engage in seasonal absences. Moreover,
by matching high frequency attendance and output data I can establish
a direct link between seasonal absences and output loss and determine to
what extent the firm is able to adjust its production process in response
to fluctuations in workers’ attendance.
The jute industry provides an interesting setting for this study be-
cause, for historical reasons, it employs a large number of workers who
migrated to West Bengal from neighbouring states (De Haan, 1997).
These workers typically come from rural areas and move in search of em-
ployment, however, in most of the cases, they leave their families behind,
thus keeping strong ties with their villages of origin. Indeed, over 60% of
the workers employed in the plant object of this study have a permanent
address in a district different from the one in which the firm is located
and about 50% come from other states. Moreover, there is substantial
heterogeneity in the districts of origin, which allows me to relate workers’
attendance patterns to agricultural labour demand shocks in their home
districts.
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I find that rural migrants are much more likely to engage in seasonal
absences than local workers. However, their attendance does not respond
to temporary shocks to agricultural productivity. On the other hand, lo-
cal workers’ attendance is much less seasonal, but they are more likely to
respond to weather shocks. This suggests that, while the former operate
de facto as seasonal workers and once they pay the cost of leaving the
firm they do not respond to small changes on agricultural productivity.
In fact, the farther the district of origin is from the factory, the higher
the workers’ absence rate during the harvest season and the lower the
response to positive shocks to agricultural productivity.
I estimate the impact of seasonal absences on firms’ productivity using
the timing of harvest as an instrument for workers’ attendance. The re-
sults suggest that 1% decrease in workers’ attendance during the harvest
season decreases the firms’ output by 1.6%. This more than proportional
response suggests that the firm is unable to adjust its production process
in response to changes in workers’ attendance and that increasing the
proportion of absent workers decreases the average productivity of those
present by generating disruptions and bottlenecks.
5.2 Context
The analysis performed in this chapter relies on payroll data from a large
jute mill located in West Bengal, India. This is a large textile plant that
specializes in jute products. It is located within Kolkatas urban area and
employs over 2,500 workers.
This type of factory is common in the area, as India is by far the
world’s greatest producer of jute and West Bengal accounts for over 70%
of overall Indian raw jute production1. It follows that the jute manufac-
turing industry is concentrated in this area: out of the 78 registered jute
mills operating in India, 63 are located in West Bengal2.
The main items produced are jute sacks to contain food products,
which are sold both for the domestic market and for export. Its level of
profitability is average, and rather stable in the past few years. The firm
is entirely owned and managed by family members, which is a feature of
the majority of Indian textile firms (Bloom et al., 2012).
1Source: Indiastat
2Source: Office of the jute commissioner website: http://jutecomm.gov.in
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The payroll data provides attendance information of both permanent
and temporary workers as long as they have a formal employment rela-
tionship with the firm. There is no information about voucher workers
and trainees.
These workers are hourly paid and they do not enjoy any overtime
premium nor paid sick leave. According to their contracts each employee
should work 8 hours per day for 6 days a week. Permanent workers
can take up to 13 days off for paid statutory leave if they have worked
for a minimum number of days during the year. They also enjoy other
benefits established by the law such as pension funds, paid festival leaves,
and high protection legislation. Temporary workers can be sent home by
the management if they show up to work in a day but they are not needed
(i.e. if there are no orders to be completed or no machines available) and
they have few benefits and almost no employment protection.
Most of the workers employed in the plant have a permanent address
in another district and about half of them come from states other than
West Bengal. This is a common feature for this industry. In fact, for
historical reasons, the jute industry located in West Bengal employs a
large amount of workers who migrated in search of employment from a
number of other northern Indian states, mainly Bihar. These are typi-
cally male rural “migrants” who leave their spouses and children in the
village to take care of the land.
De Haan (1997) provides a good description of the livelihoods of jute
mill workers and explains how they have remained virtually unchanged
since the beginning of the twentieth century. Qualitative evidence sug-
gests that maintaining such strong ties with their rural backgrounds,
these workers are highly likely to take long leaves and return to their
villages particularly during the harvest season. In fact, firms operating
in this industry have historically faced very high absence rates (Chand
and Banerji, 1952)during periods of peak agricultural activities.
The production process is mostly based on low skilled labour, al-
though some occupations such as weaving and spinning require up to
one year of training. This implies that workers cannot be easily substi-
tuted in case of absence or allocated to different occupations. De Haan
(1999) argues that temporary workers are hired precisely with the ob-
jective to substitute the absent workers during periods of high absence
rates.
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5.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics
5.3.1 Payroll Data
This chapter relies on payroll data from a large jute mill for the period
between September 2010 and June 2014. The original dataset contains
attendance and wage information for all regular3 workers employed dur-
ing this period, 3,384 in total, at fortnight frequency.
It is an unbalanced panel as workers are reported in the data only if
they work for at least one hour during the fortnight and no information
is provided about accessions nor separations. Since the main outcome of
interest is workers’ attendance, and it is common for workers to be absent
for a period of 15 days or more, I impute the missing observations as zero
whenever a worker is absent from the dataset up to 6 consecutive periods
(3 months) and then returns to the factory. Workers with attendance
gaps longer than 6 consecutive fortnights are excluded from the analysis4.
I also drop 58 workers whose average absence rate was above 52% (top
1% of the distribution) to remove outliers.
I merge the payroll data with the firm’s master database that includes
information on workers’ characteristics, gender, date of birth, and district
of residence. In this data cleaning process, I exclude 271 more workers for
whom no district or origin information was available or who are registered
as retired. The final dataset includes attendance information for 2,801
workers.
Panel A in table 5.1 reports summary statistics for some of the work-
ers’ characteristics included in the dataset. The average worker age is
almost 37 years and the average tenure within the firm is 9.43 years; al-
most all of the workers are male (97%) and 82% are literate; the majority
of workers are Hindu, but 14% are Muslim; in most cases workers have
permanent contracts as the share of temporary workers is on average 8%.
As is the case for most jute mills in the area, the majority of workers
are migrants from rural areas. In fact only 41% have a permanent resi-
dence within the Kolkata urban area5, where the factory is located, and
only 53% have permanent residence in West Bengal. The map presented
3These are all the workers employed full time in the factory. At each particular
point in time there may have been up to 500 additional voucher workers or trainees
for which no information is provided.
4Using this criterion I am dropping 254 workers.
5I define Kolkata urban area as the districts of Kolkata and Howra.
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in figure 5.1 shows that there is substantial heterogeneity in the workers’
district of origin. In fact, they are spread across various northern Indian
states including Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Orissa and Jharkhand. The av-
erage distance between Kolkata and the workers’ district of origin is 239
km.
Workers attendance
The payroll dataset contains information about the number of hours
worked by each worker at fortnight frequency. The working hours are
classified into three categories: regular hours, overtime hours, and extra
hours, where the latter indicates hours worked during the worker’s day
off. Since each worker is expected to work 8 hours a day, 6 days a
week, with the exception of public holidays and statutory leave, I am
able to estimate for each worker the number of hours scheduled in each
fortnight. This allows me to calculate the workers’ absence rate as 1
minus the share of hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled
in a fortnight. Figure 5.2 shows the distribution of workers’ absences
by fortnight. Absence rates in this firm are in general very high, with a
median level of 19%. However, there is a substantial heterogeneity across
the period with absence rates ranging from 10% to 30%.
Characteristics of migrant workers
Table 5.2 reports summary statistics for workers characteristics by migra-
tion status, where workers are defined as rural migrants if their district
of residence is outside Kolkatas urban area. The table shows that while
the migrants are on average 1.42 years younger than local workers, they
actually have 0.88 years longer tenure within the firm. Migrants are also
2 percentage points less likely to be temporary workers and they earn
slightly higher wages on average. Local workers are 4 percentage points
more likely to be female, 8 percentage points more likely to be literate,
and 6 percentage points less likely to be Muslim. Most of the migrants
come from states other than West Bengal and the average distance be-
tween Kolkata and their district of residence is 421 km. Absence rates
are 5 percentage points higher for the migrants while overtime rates are
identical. Figure 5.3 shows the distribution of workers’ average absence
rates by migration status. The entire distribution of average absence
rates for rural migrants is shifted to the right, showing that the differ-
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ence in means is not driven by few outliers but rather it is common for
these workers to have lower levels of attendance. A further inspection
of the data shows that the higher absence rates are mostly driven by
migrant workers taking long leaves and then returning to the firm. Since
migrants are less likely to be temporary workers, this cannot be explained
by the nature of the contract.
5.3.2 Output Data
The plant is mostly engaged in production of jute fabric and sacks to
contain food. While there could be differences in quality from one batch
to another, the firm uses the weight of the produce to monitor output.
This measure, originally collected on a daily basis, is aggregated at the
fortnight level in order to be matched with payroll data. To ensure com-
parability across periods, given that there is some variation in number
of days in which the firm operates, I calculate output per day. I exclude
output produced on Tuesdays, which is when most workers have their
weekly day off. Summary statistics are reported in panel B of table 5.1.
5.3.3 Crop Calendar and Weather Shocks
I combine these data with information about the local agricultural cal-
endar and weather shocks in the workers district of origin. I focus only
on the rice crop calendar for the following reasons: rice is the major crop
in the states where workers employed in this plant are originally from; I
have no access to land use data for the years covered by the analysis so I
cannot construct a more accurate measure of crop harvest intensity and
monthly weather shocks that I use in the other chapters of this thesis.
I obtain a district specific crop calendar for rabi and kharif rice from
the 1967 Indian Crop Calendar published by the Directorate of Eco-
nomics and Statistics. This allows me to determine when it is harvest
season both in the workers district of origin and in the area in which the
factory is located. Figure 5.4 shows that there is substantial heterogene-
ity in the calendar months in which rice is harvested across the workers
district of origin. In particular, rabi rice is harvested between April and
June and kharif rice is harvested mainly during the months of November
and December. Importantly, there is no calendar month in which rice is
harvested in all districts.
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I construct district-wise monthly weather shocks using rainfall and
temperature data collected by the Center of Climatic Research at the
University of Delaware, combined with the district specific rice crop cal-
endar. Following Donaldson (2015), I calculate cumulative rainfall and
average temperature during the rice growing season, which is defined as
the period of time between the first month of sowing and the last month
of harvesting.
Summary statistics for these variables are reported in panel C of table
5.1. It is important to note that weather shock data are available only
for the months in which rice is harvested and they refer to cumulative
rainfall and average temperature affecting the relative growing season.
5.3.4 Seasonal Absences
Figure 5.5 plots average attendance rates for each calendar month by
migration status. The solid line represents attendance of local work-
ers, while the dashed line represents attendance of rural migrants. The
shaded area indicates the calendar months in which the harvest of rice
takes place in the region. During the harvest seasons, attendance is low-
est for both groups but the pattern is much stronger for rural migrants.
In fact, rural migrants’ average attendance rates, while comparable to
those of local workers outside of harvest season, drop below 75% in some
of the harvest months.
Figure 5.6 shows that the firm’s output follows the same seasonal
pattern as workers’ attendance. This suggests that the firm is not able
to adjust its production process in response to workers’ absences. Even
if the firm could respond to workers’ absences by hiring casual labour
or by asking present workers to work overtime, the graph suggests this
adjustment does not take place. In fact, the variation in average output
per day appears to be even larger than that in workers’ attendance.
During harvest months there are some periods during which the plant
produces less than 75 metric tonnes per day, much below the average of
85 and the maximum of almost 1006.
6Further inspection of the data shows that this is not driven by few events such
as power outages or strikes. The raw data shows that, even if there are some days of
very low productivity, most of the daily observations are clustered around the period
average
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5.4 Empirical Strategy
The seasonal patterns in workers’ absences could be driven by factors
other than agricultural labour demand. In order to test the hypothesis
that workers’ attendance responds to changes in their outside option I
use two different strategies. First, I look at to what extent their absence
rates vary between harvest and non-harvest seasons. Then, I exploit
exogenous shocks to agricultural productivity to assess to what extent
absence rates, during the harvest season, respond to changes in agricul-
tural labour demand.
In order to measure to what extent absence rates increase during the
harvest season I estimate the following empirical model:
Absenceidfmt = βharvestdm + vt + wi + idfmt (5.1)
where: Absenceidfmt is the percentage of working hours lost because of
absence of worker i originally from district d in fortnight f , calendar
month m and year t, calculated as is defined as 1 minus the share of
regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in the
fortnight; harvestdm is a dummy indicating whether it is harvest season
for rice in the workers’ district of origin d in calendar month m. yt and
wi represent year and worker fixed effect, respectively.
In order to account for heterogeneous responses in the absence rates
of rural migrants, I interact harvestdm with a dummy indicating whether
the worker’s district of origin is outside Kolkata’s urban area: migranti
in the following equation:
Absenceidfmt = β1harvestdm + β2harvest
∗
dmmigrantd + vt + wi + idfmt
(5.2)
The limited variation in rice harvest calendars in the area prevents
me from including calendar month fixed effects in the regression and,
therefore, from testing whether, within a calendar month, the increase in
absence rates is due to harvest or other seasonal events.
Therefore, I exploit weather shocks to agricultural productivity to
test whether absence rates are higher when agricultural productivity is
higher and workers have better outside options in agriculture. To do so
I estimate the following equation:
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Absenceidfmt = β1Rainfalldmt + β2Temperaturedmt + vdm + wi + idfmt
(5.3)
where Rainfalldmt and Temperaturedmt represent cumulative rainfall
and average temperature during the growing season of rice harvested
in calendar month m of year t in the workers’ district of origin d. To
control for the fact that rice growing in different seasons, i.e. rabi or
kharif, are exposed to completely different weather conditions and the
fact that different districts have different soil and geographic structure,
I include district time calendar month fixed effect vdm.
Since weather shock data are only available for the months in which
rice is harvested, this specification is looking at whether differences in
agricultural productivity from one year to another are affecting absence
rates during the harvest season.
The results reported in chapter 2 indicate that an increase in growing
season rainfall has a positive effect on crop yield; while higher grow-
ing season temperature reduces crop yield. Moreover, a positive shock
to agricultural productivity increases labour demand and, as a conse-
quence, agricultural wages. Therefore, if workers’ absence rates respond
to changes in their outside option, I expect that an increase in growing
season rainfall would increase absences and an increase in growing season
temperature would decrease them.
To evaluate the effect of absences on output I need to estimate the
production function proposed in chapter 3:
Y = A(aγL)αKβ (5.4)
where Y represents the firm’s output; A is total factor productivity; a
is workers’ attendance rate; L is the number of hours scheduled and K
is capital. The parameter of interest is γ, which is the factor by which
attendance affects labour productivity. In particular, if γ = 0 the firm
can fully adjust its production process if workers are absent and changes
in attendance have no impact on output; if γ = 1 changes in attendance
affect output as much as changes in labour input; if γ > 1 absences
decrease the productivity of the hours effectively worked. This function
can be represented by the following empirical model:
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log(Yfmt) = log(A) + αγlog(attfmt) + αlog(Lfmt) + wt + ufmt (5.5)
where Yfmt represents firm’s output in fortnight f , calendar month m
and year t ; attfmt is the average worker’s attendance rate in period fmt
and Lfmt is the total number of hours scheduled in period fmt. This
model is estimated on period level data so one observation represents a
fortnight. I include year fixed effects wt to control for changes in capital
stock and other unobservables.
In order to obtain a causal estimate of the parameter of interest I use
an instrumental variable strategy in exploring the relationship between
attendance rate and the timing of harvest discussed above. The first
stage regression is represented by the following equation:
log(attfmt) = βshare harvestm + wt + efmt (5.6)
where: share harvestm represents the share of workers in whose districts
it is rice harvest season in calendar month m.
5.5 Results
Table 5.3 reports the results for estimation of equations 5.1 and 5.2 both
with and without individual worker fixed effects. Column (1) shows that
absence rates are on average 3 percentage points higher during the har-
vest months. Moreover, rural migrants’ absence rates are 4.4 percentage
points higher than those of local workers. Column (2) shows that the
increase in absence rates is almost entirely driven by the behaviour of
rural migrants. Indeed, rural migrants’ absence rates are 5 percentage
points higher during the harvest season, while the absence rates of local
workers increase only by 0.66 percentage points. Column (3) and (4)
show similar results when including individual worker fixed effects, sug-
gesting that the results are not driven by differences in composition of
the workforce across seasons. An alternative interpretation, however, is
that rural migrants are de facto treated as seasonal workers and are not
expected to show up when they are busy with outside agricultural jobs.
Table 5.4 reports the estimates of equation 5.3. Column (1) shows
that 100 mm increase in growing season cumulative rainfall increases ab-
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sence rates during the harvest by 0.23 percentage points. This implies
that one standard deviation increase in rainfall (513 mm) would increase
absence rates by 1.18 percentage points. Column (2) shows that 1 °C
increase in growing season temperature decreased absence rates by 1.79
percentage point. Therefore, one standard deviation increase in temper-
ature (1.18 °C) would decrease absence rates by 2.11 percentage points.
Rainfall and temperature are likely to be negatively correlated so the
coefficients decrease slightly when both are included in the same regres-
sion as reported in column (3). Columns (4) to (6) report the results of
the interaction between the weather measures and the dummy variable
indicating whether the worker is a rural migrant. None of the interaction
coefficients are significantly different from zero and they have opposite
sign with respect to the main coefficients. This suggests that the ef-
fect found in columns (1) to (3) was mainly driven by local workers and
that while rural migrants are more likely to be absent during the harvest
season, they do not respond to shocks to agricultural productivity.
To interpret the results, I repeat the analysis including an interac-
tion between the main independent variable and a measure of distance
between the factory and the workers’ district of origin. These results
are reported in table 5.5. Column (2) shows that workers’ absence rates
increase in the distance between the factory and the workers’ district
of origin; while column (4) show that the workers’ response to positive
shocks to agricultural productivity decrease in this distance.
The estimates of the effect of seasonal absences on the firms’ out-
put are reported in table 5.6. Column (1) reports the OLS estimate for
the effect of attendance on productivity. Attendance and productivity
appear to be positively correlated. In particular, a 1% increase in at-
tendance would increase output by 1.4%. This suggests that changes in
attendance rates have a much larger impact than changes in the labour
force. However, this analysis is based on data from a single plant and the
variation in hours scheduled exploited to estimate this coefficient comes
mainly from the number of working days available in a fortnight, which
depends on the length of the month and public holidays. Column (2)
reports the first stage regression that is the effect of harvest on work-
ers’ attendance. As already discussed above, attendance rates are lower
during the harvest season, the relationship is negative and statistically
significant. Column (3) reports the second stage regression. The results
90
suggest that a 1% decrease in workers’ attendance during the harvest
season decreases the firms’ output by 1.6%. The difference between this
coefficient and the one reported in column (1) is due to the fact that the
instrumental variable strategy adopted allow me to identify the effect of
seasonal absences rather than absences in general. Although for this firm
these are by far the most important sources of variation in workers’ at-
tendance, they may have a higher impact on firms’ productivity as they
cause a larger disruption in the production process in a period in which
it is harder to find substitute workers since a large fraction of the labour
force is busy with agricultural activities.
The estimates of the parameter of interest γ is 7.6 for the OLS re-
gression and 9.6 for the IV estimation. In both cases the null hypothesis
that is equal to 1 can be rejected at a 10% level of significance.
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Figures
Figure 5.1: Number of Workers by District of Origin
Notes: The figure represents the number of workers employed by the jute mill by
district of origin on a map of India.
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Figure 5.2: Distribution Absence Rates Over Time
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of absence rates by fortnight, obtained by
aggregating workers absence rated into fortnight averages. The vertical line indicates
the distribution median, corresponding to 19%. Absence rate is defined as the 1
minus the share of regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in
a fortnight.
Figure 5.3: Distribution Workers’ Absence Rates
Notes: The figure plots the distribution of workers’ averge absence rates by workers’
migration status. Workers absence rated into individual averages. Rural migrants are
defined as workers whose district of residence is outside Kolkata’s urban area (defined
as the districts of Kolkata and Howra). Absence rate is defined as the 1 minus the
share of regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in a fortnight.
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Figure 5.4: Rice Harvest by Calendar Month
Notes: The figure represents the share of workers’ district of origin in which rice is
harvested by in each calendar month.
Figure 5.5: Seasonal Absences
Notes: The figure plots average attendance rates for each calendar month by migration
status. The solid line represent attendance of local workers; while the dashed line
represents attendance or rural migrants. Rural migrants are defined as workers whose
district of residence is outside Kolkata’s urban area (defined as the districts of Kolkata
and Howra). The shaded area indicates the calendar months in which harvest of rice
takes place in the area including the workers’ districts of orgin.
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Figure 5.6: Seasonality in Output
Notes: The figure plots average output per day for each fortnight. The shaded area
indicates the calendar months in which harvest of rice takes place in the area including
the workers’ districts of orgin.
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Tables
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Observations
Panel A: Worker’s Data
Age 36.66 8.75 206,307
Tenure 9.44 4.51 205,389
Female 0.02 0.16 206,598
Read/write 0.82 0.39 146,986
Muslim 0.14 0.34 148,705
Temporary 0.08 0.27 206,629
Local (district) 0.41 0.49 206,629
Local (state) 0.53 0.50 206,629
Distance to district of origin (km) 240.94 252.31 206,629
Absence rate (%) 18.62 27.10 206,629
Overtime rate (%) 0.08 0.16 206,629
Daily wage (INR) 273.88 56.12 206,629
Panel B: Production Data
Output per day (metric tonnes) 82.65 9.38 92
Panel C: Crop Calendar & Weather Data
Rice harvest 0.29 0.45 206,629
Growing season cum rainfall (100 mm) 6.64 5.13 60,618
Growing season avg temperature (°C) 25.74 1.18 60,618
Notes: Panel A reports summary statistics for a panel dataset of worker characteristics, atten-
dance behaviour and wages in which the unit of observation is at the worker-fortnight level.
This is an unbalanced panel covering 2,801 workers over the period between September 2010
to June 2014. The information about workers’ characteristics comes from the firms workers’
database collected at three points in time between July 2011 and July 2014. Age and Tenure
are calculated respectively as the difference between the current year and the worker’s year
of birth and the year the worker joined the firm; Read/write is a dummy indicating whether
the worker is able to read and write; Muslim is equal to one for Muslim workers, zero for
Hindu workers; Temporary is equal to one for temporary workers, zero for permanent work-
ers; Local (district) is a dummy indicating whether the worker’s permanent address is within
Kolkata’s urban area; Local (state) is a dummy indicating whether the worker’s permanent
address is within West Bengal; Distance to district of origin is the distance between the cen-
troid of the worker’s district of origin and Kolkata; Absence rate is calculated as 1 minus
the share of regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in the fortnight;
Overtime rate is defined as the number of overtime hours worked during the fortnight divided
by the total number of hours scheduled; Daily wage is calculated as total payment received
in the fortnight divided by number of (8-hour) days worked, if the worker worked zero hours
during the fortnight, the observation is replace by the workers’ average daily wage. Panel B
reports firm’s output per day, measured in terms of metric tonnes, aggregated at the fort-
night level. Output produced on tuesdays is excluded as most workers have a dey off in these
days. Panel C report summary statistics for rice harvest dummy and weather shocks. Rice
harvest is a dummy indicating whether is harvest season for rice in the workers district of
origin; Growing season cum rainfall and Growing season avg temperature represent cumula-
tive rainfall and average temperature during rice growing season in the workers’ district of
origin, these measure are reported in the month in which rice is harvested.
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Table 5.2: Characteristics of the Migrants
Local Workers Rural Migrants
(obs: 54,188) (obs: 90,911)
mean mean diff
(st dev) (st dev) (st error)
Age 38.32 36.90 1.42***
(8.49 ) ( 8.47) (0.05)
Tenure 9.69 10.574 -0.88***
(4.32) (4.42) (0.02 )
Female 0.05 0.00 0.04***
(0.21) (0.06) (0.00)
Read/write 0.87 0.79 0.08***
(0.34) (0.41) (0.00)
Muslim 0.10 0.16 -0.06***
(0.30) (0.37) (0.00)
Temporary 0.05 0.04 0.02***
(0.22) (0.19) (0.00)
Local (district) 1.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00)
Local (state) 1.00 0.16
(0.00) (0.37)
Distance to district of origin (km) 0.00 421.83
(0.00) (190.15 )
Absence rate 0.15 0.20 -0.05**
(0.21) ( 0.30 ) (0.00)
Overtime rate (%) 0.08 0.08 -0.00
(0.16) (0.17) (0.00)
Daily wage (INR) 280.99 282.37 -1.38***
(57.11) (53.20) (0.30)
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the worker characteristics by migra-
tion status, where rural migrants are defined as workers whose district of residence
is outside Kolkata’s urban area (defined as the districts of Kolkata and Howra). The
sample is restricted to those observations for which all variables are available. Age
and Tenure are calculated respectively as the difference between the current year
and the worker’s year of birth and the year the worker joined the firm; Read/write is
a dummy indicating whether the worker is able to read and write; Muslim is equal
to one for Muslim workers, zero for Hindu workers; Temporary is equal to one for
temporary workers, zero for permanent workers; Local (district) is a dummy indi-
cating whether the worker’s permanent address is within Kolkata’s urban area; Lo-
cal (state) is a dummy indicating whether the worker’s permanent address is within
West Bengal; Distance to district of origin is the distance between the centroid of
the worker’s district of origin and Kolkata; Absence rate is calculated as 1 minus the
share of regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in the fort-
night; Overtime rate is defined as the number of overtime hours worked during the
fortnight divided by the total number of hours scheduled; Daily wage is calculated as
total payment received in the fortnight divided by number of (8-hour) days worked,
if the worker worked zero hours during the fortnight, the observation is replace by
the workers’ average daily wage.
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Table 5.3: Seasonality in Workers’ Absences
Dependent Variable: Absence Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice Harvest 3.043∗∗∗ 0.665∗∗∗ 3.362∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.178) (0.202) (0.178)
Rice Harvest*Rural Migrant 4.362∗∗∗ 5.055∗∗∗
(0.383) (0.375)
Rural Migrant 4.392∗∗∗ 3.059∗∗∗
(0.427) (0.421)
Worker FE - - Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Observations 206629 206629 206629 206629
Adjusted R2 0.010 0.011 0.150 0.152
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of working hours lost be-
cause of absence in a fortnight, it is calculated as 1 minus the share of
regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled in the
fortnight; Rice Harvest is a dummy indicating whether is harvest sea-
son for rice in the workers district of origin; Rural Migrant is a dummy
indicating whether the worker’s permanent address is outside Kolkata’s
urban area. Columns (1) and (2) include year FE. Columns (3) and (4)
include year and worker effects. Standard errors are clustered at the
worker level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.4: Seasonal Absences and Agricultural Productivity
Dependent Variable: Absence Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cum Rainfall (100 mm) 0.230∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.063) (0.063) (0.066)
Avg Temperature (°C) -1.791∗∗∗ -1.414∗∗ -2.930∗∗∗ -2.159∗∗
(0.622) (0.649) (0.868) (0.907)
Cum Rainfall * Migrant -0.068 -0.123
(0.147) (0.156)
Avg Temperature * Migrant 1.390 0.776
(1.054) (1.115)
Contemp Rainfall (100 mm) 0.302 0.447 0.409 0.317 0.610 0.537
(0.487) (0.492) (0.492) (0.488) (0.513) (0.514)
Contemp Temperature (°C) -0.175 0.110 0.096 -0.177 0.209 0.166
(0.204) (0.227) (0.228) (0.204) (0.242) (0.242)
Worker FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
District*Calendar Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 60618 60618 60618 60618 60618 60618
Adjusted R2 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230 0.230
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of working hours lost because of absence in a fortnight, it
is calculated as 1 minus the share of regular hours worked over the total number of hours scheduled
in the fortnight; Cum Rainfall and Avg Temperature represent cumulative rainfall and average tem-
perature during rice growing season in the workers’ district of origin, these measure are reported in
the month in which rice is harvested; Migrant is a dummy indicating whether the worker’s perma-
nent address is outside Kolkata’s urban area; Contemp Rainfall and Contemp Temperature represent
rainfall and temperature in the district in which the factory operates in the month in which pro-
duction takes place. All specifications include worker district of origin*calendar month and worker
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.5: Seasonal Absences and Distance from Workers’ Districts of
Origin
Dependent Variable: Absence Rate (%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rice Harvest 0.653∗∗∗ 0.654∗∗∗
(0.178) (0.178)
Rice Harvest*Rural Migrant 5.055∗∗∗ -1.449∗∗∗
(0.375) (0.499)
Rice Harvest*Distance 0.017∗∗∗
(0.001)
Cum Rainfall (100 mm) 0.201∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.066)
Avg Temperature (°C) -2.159∗∗ -2.161∗∗
(0.907) (0.909)
Cum Rainfall * Migrant -0.123 0.146
(0.156) (0.184)
Avg Temperature * Migrant 0.776 1.259
(1.115) (1.731)
Cum Rainfall * Distance -0.001∗
(0.001)
Avg Temperature * Distance -0.002
(0.004)
Worker FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y - -
District*Calendar Month FE - - Y Y
Observations 206629 206629 60618 60618
Adjusted R2 0.152 0.154 0.230 0.230
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of working hours lost because of
absence in a fortnight, it is calculated as 1 minus the share of regular hours
worked over the total number of hours scheduled in the fortnight; Rice Har-
vest is a dummy indicating whether is harvest season for rice in the workers
district of origin; Rural Migrant is a dummy indicating whether the worker’s
permanent address is outside Kolkata’s urban area; Cum Rainfall and Avg
Temperature represent cumulative rainfall and average temperature during
rice growing season in the workers’ district of origin, these measure are re-
ported in the month in which rice is harvested; Migrant is a dummy indi-
cating whether the worker’s permanent address is outside Kolkata’s urban
area; Distance is the distance between the centroid of the worker’s district
of origin and Kolkata. Standard errors are clustered at the worker level. ∗
p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 5.6: Seasonal Absences and Productivity (2SLS)
OLS FS IV RF
Log(output) Log(attendance) Log(output) Log(output)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(attendance) 1.400∗∗∗ 1.636∗∗∗
(0.151) (0.363)
Log(hours scheduled) 0.185∗∗∗ 0.080∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.044) (0.064) (0.072)
Rice Harvest -0.069∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.030)
Contemp Rainfall (100 m) 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.012
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.009)
Contemp Temperature (°C) -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
γ 7.564∗∗ 9.621∗∗
(2.917) (4.768)
P-value γ = 1 0.024 0.071
Observations 92 92 92 92
Adjusted R2 0.561 0.284 0.551 0.310
Notes: The dependent variable in column (1) (3) and (4) is the natural logarithm of output pro-
duced in the fortnight; while the depend variable columns (2) the natural logarithm of workers’
attendance rate in the fortnight. Column (1) reports OLS estimates of the effect of attendance;
column (2) and (3) report, respectively, the first and second stage of the 2SLS estimate of the
effect of attendance on firms’ output; column (4) reports the reduced form. All specifications
include year fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗
p < 0.01
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6. Conclusions
This thesis studied the linkages between agricultural and manufacturing
labour markets in a an economy in which the agricultural sector still
employs the majority of the labour force. For the process of structural
transformation to be completed, manufacturing firms must hire workers
who have an agricultural background. However, these workers are more
likely to be absent from the workplace when labour demand in agriculture
is high.
To support this hypothesis, I show that fluctuations in agricultural
wages, determined by seasonality and by exogenous shocks to agricultural
productivity, are able to attract workers away from the factories and back
to the fields. In particular, using on personnel data from large jute mill,
I shows that this phenomenon is more prevalent among rural migrants
who have strong ties with the agricultural sector.
Moreover, I find that this effect is stronger in firms facing a more
stringent labour protection legislation, suggesting that workers take are
more likely to take advantage of outside opportunities when they are less
likely to lose their jobs.
Exploring exogenous shocks to agricultural productivity, namely grow-
ing season rainfall and temperature, I estimate the effect of seasonal ab-
sences on firms’ productivity, finding a very large result: a 1% decrease
in yearly attendance rate, caused by an increase in agricultural produc-
tivity, decreases output by 6%. This can be explained by the fact that
in the periods of high labour demand in agriculture, a large amount of
workers are likely to be absent simultaneously and finding replacement
is harder. This causes severe disruptions in the production process and
reduce also the productivity of the present workers.
I propose a theoretical model that explains the existence of this phe-
nomenon as a consequence of the fact that firms are not able to adjust
wages and labour force in response to shocks to agricultural productivity.
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I use the parameters estimated in my empirical analysis to calibrate a
simple model and evaluate the loss in efficiency caused by labour market
rigidities. I find that in presence of seasonality in workers outside option,
firms facing rigid labour market condition end up hiring fewer workers,
paying lower wages and producing less than they would if they could
adjust wages and employment seasonally.
While labour protection regulation is particularly stringent for firms
operating in the Indian manufacturing sector, these findings apply to
other settings in which labour market rigidities are asymmetric across
sectors. Indeed, it is common to observe seasonal jobs in agriculture
and permanent jobs in the manufacturing sector as a consequence of the
different labour requirements characterising the production process.
The policy implications of this work are in line with that of literature
on labour regulation and firms’ performance (Besley and Burgess, 2004).
In fact, this thesis provides evidence of a mechanism in which labour
market rigidities may end up harming both firms and workers. In par-
ticular, I show that strong worker protection, combined with the lack of
clear regulation absences, makes workers’ attendance unpredictable for
the firm, reducing the incentives to hire workers and, therefore, shrinking
manufacturing employment.
The problem of workers’ absences could be mitigated by improving
human resources management and reduce the incentives for workers to
be absent when they have a better outside option. The literature on
management practices in this context (Bloom et al., 2012) suggest that
there is large room for improvement. However, further research is needed
to identify which measures could be taken by the firms to incentivise
workers’ attendance.
Finally, this thesis focuses only on one particular source of work-
ers’ absences. While seasonal absences appear to be important they do
not fully explain why Indian firms face so high absence rates. Further
research is needed to identify other causes of workers absences and to
estimate their cost for the firm.
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